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Abstract 
 
Historically, China was a soybean nation and not a dairy 
nation.  Today, China has become the world’s largest dairy importer 
and third largest dairy producer, and dairy has surpassed soybeans in 
both consumption volume and sales revenue.  This article 
investigates the legal, political, and socioeconomic factors that drove 
this transformation, and building upon fieldwork in two Chinese 
counties, examines the transformation’s socioeconomic impact on 
China’s several hundred million farmers and ex-farmers and political 
impact on the Chinese regime.  The article makes two arguments.  
First, despite changes of times and political regimes, China’s dairy 
tale is a tale about chasing the dreams of progress, modernization, 
and national rejuvenation.  Second, and more tentatively, China’s 
recent moves toward hard authoritarianism have global roots and can 
be interpreted in part as political reactions to the systemic job losses 
and social dislocation in rural-agricultural China after its embrace of 
globalization. 
I.  Introduction 
Historically, China was not a dairy nation.  The majority-
Han Chinese did not drink milk or eat cheese or yogurt.1  As a matter 
of fact, studies have found that Chinese people have very high levels 
                                                 
*  Xiaoqian Hu is an associate professor of law at the University of Arizona James 
E. Rogers College of Law.  I would like to thank the University of Arizona for 
hosting the symposium and the symposium participants for their helpful questions 
and comments.  Special thanks go to Andy Coan, David Gantz, Shi-Ling Hsu, 
Michael Pappas, Justin Pidot, Sergio Puig, and Andrew Woods, whose insights 
improved this article tremendously; and to Jessica Eisen and Erum Sattar, whose 
friendship, support, and inspiration were essential to the completion of this article.  I 
would also like to thank Harvard Law School East Asian Legal Studies and Harvard 
University Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies for funding my fieldwork; and 
William Alford, Martha Fineman, and Duncan Kennedy for useful feedback on the 
initial conceptualization of the fieldwork.  I am grateful to Collette Cox and the staff 
of the Journal of Food Law & Policy for their terrific editorial assistance.  I owe the 
deepest debt of gratitude to the hundreds of interlocutors in rural China, whose 
participation, generosity, and open-mindedness made this article possible. 
1  Françoise Sabban, The Taste for Milk in Modern China (1865-1937), in FOOD 
CONSUMPTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF FOOD IN 
HONOUR OF JACK GOODY 184 (Jakob A. Klein & Anne Murcott eds., 2014) (noting 
both milk’s cultural signification as a “barbarian food” and a lack of ordinary milk 
consumption in traditional China). 
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of lactose malabsorption.2  On the other hand, China has always been 
a soybean nation.  It was the first nation to cultivate soybeans and, to 
this day, it remains the largest nation of soybean consumption. 3  
Soybeans pervade the traditional Han diet—from soy oil, soy sauce, 
and tofu (a product so closely related to China that even the West 
calls it by its Chinese name) to bean sprouts, bean paste, and various 
fermented products.4  If one had to identify a “milk” in the traditional 
Chinese diet, it would be doujiang (豆浆)—a hot, often sweetened 
breakfast drink made from soybeans.5  In the Chinese language, dou 
means beans, and since soybean is the bean for the Han Chinese, dou 
implies soybeans.6  Jiang refers to a thick liquid, often from a plant.7  
As China historian Jia-Chen Fu documents, renaming doujiang 
“soymilk” was part of a deliberate nation-building effort by 
progressive intellectuals, social reformers, emerging entrepreneurs, 
and government officials of the Republican era (1912-1949).8  
 
Today, while China continues to be the world’s largest 
soybean consumer,9 it has also become the world’s third largest dairy 
                                                 
2  See, e.g., Wang Yongfa et al., Prevalence of Primary Adult Lactose Malabsorption 
in Three Populations of Northern China, 67 HUM. GENETICS 103, 103 (1984). 
3  Leqing Zhiku (乐晴智库) [Leqing Think Tank], Dounai Hangye: Zhongguo 
Dounai Xiaoliang Quanqiu Diyi, Shichang Guimo Jin Baiyi (豆奶行业：中国豆奶
销量全球第一，市场规模近百亿) [Soymilk Industry: Chinese Soymilk Sales No. 
1 in the World, Market Size Approaches 10 Billion Yuan], SINA CAIJING TOUTIAO 
(SINA财经头条) [SINA FIN. HEADLINES] (July 4, 2017), https://cj.sina.com.cn/article 
/detail/5160876646/307624. 
4  See Soy Story: The History of the Soybean, EATING CHINA, https://www.eatingchin 
a.com/articles/soystory.htm (last updated Dec. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Soy Story]; see 
also Soy Products, EATING CHINA, https://www.eatingchina.com/articles/soyproduc 
ts.htm (last updated January 13, 2020). 
5  Doujiang was likely invented in the early Han Dynasty (202 BC-220 AD), but did 
not become part of the Chinese diet until mid- to late Qing (1644-1912).  JIA-CHEN 
FU, THE OTHER MILK: REINVENTING SOY IN REPUBLICAN CHINA 17 (2018). 
6  See Soy Story, supra note 4.   
7  Id. 
8  See FU, supra note 5, at 109–28 (discussing the rebranding of “doujiang” into 
“soymilk”); see also infra Part II (providing more information on this piece of 
history). 
9  FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select the 
“Crops and livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “Select All” 
in the countries field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select 
“Soybeans” in the items field; select the most recent year; click “Show Data”).  A 
caveat is in order.  This article cites statistics from numerous sources, including 
international organizations, government agencies of the United States and China, 
non-governmental organizations, and researchers.  Data collection raises concerns 
about accuracy and representativeness.  Such concerns are particularly acute when 
the data is collected by governmental agencies in China and no external mechanisms 
are available to verify their reliability.  I plead that readers interpret the data cited in 
this article as rough (at times very rough) and rebuttable guides to help grasp the 
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producer,10 and the world’s largest importer of dairy products, dairy 
cows, and hay and alfalfa.11  Most significantly, dairy has surpassed 
soybeans—by large margins—in both consumption volume and 
sales revenue. 12   The relative decline of soybeans in the 
contemporary Chinese diet does not mean a decline of soybean use, 
however.  As a matter of fact, soybeans have transformed from a 
human food to predominantly an input for industrial production of 
meat, mostly pork—a highly valued, rarely consumed luxury food in 
traditional China but a dinner table essential in contemporary 
China.13 
 
How did this dietary transformation happen?  How does it 
affect dairy and soybean farmers in China?  What are its international 
ramifications, or is it a result, at least in part, of international forces?  
What, if any, connection does it have with the worldwide resurgence 
of globalization discontentment, and of populism and 
authoritarianism, or with the recent moves toward (or return to) “hard 
authoritarianism” in China?14   Last, but not least, how does law 
feature in this picture? 
                                                 
macro- and micro-level socioeconomic changes that are taking place in China and 
that have been observed by researchers and other analysts, myself included. 
10  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DAIRY: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE 13 (July 2019), 
https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-
esmis/files/5t34sj56t/3f462h141/p8419020t/dairy.pdf.  
11  Zhongguo Naiye Xiehui (中国奶业协会) [China Dairy Association], Zhongguo 
de Naiye Baipi Shu: Zhongguo Naiye Jiben Qingkuang he Fazhan Xian Zhuang (《
中国的奶业》白皮书：中国奶业基本情况和发展现状 ) [White Paper on 
“China’s Dairy Industry”: Basic Situation and Development Status of China’s 
Dairy Industry], YANGGUANG XUMU WANG (阳光畜牧网 ) [SUNSHINE ANIMAL 
HUSBANDRY NETWORK] (July 13, 2019), http://www.ygsite.cn/show.asp?id=70950. 
12  In 2018, Chinese citizens consumed 8.3 kg of soy products and 12.2 kg of dairy 
on average.  See China Statistical Yearbook 2019: 6-4 Per Capita Consumption of 
Major Foods Nationwide, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).  In 
2017, the national sales of various soymilk products totaled ¥8.3 billion ($1.2 
billion), while the national sales of various dairy products totaled ¥98 billion ($14 
billion).  See Leqing Zhiku, supra note 3; Zhongshang Qingbao Wang (中商情报
网) [China Business Intelligence Network], 2018 Nian Zhongguo Niunai Shichang 
Fenxi ji 2019 Nian Yuce (2018 年中国牛奶市场分析及 2019 年预测) [2018 
Analysis and 2019 Predictions of the Chinese Dairy Market], SINA CAIJING TOUTIAO 
(SINA财经头条) [SINA FIN. HEADLINES] (Dec. 27, 2018), https://cj.sina.com.cn/artic 
les/view/1245286342/4a398fc600100gxw1. 
13  See generally Gustavo de L. T. Oliveira & Mindi Schneider, The Politics of 
Flexing Soybeans: China, Brazil, and Global Agroindustrial Restructuring, 43 J. 
PEASANT STUD. 167 (2016); see James L. Watson, Meat: A Cultural Biography in 
(South) China, in FOOD CONSUMPTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 25, 25–44 (Jakob A. 
Klein et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the cultural and spiritual meanings of pork in 
traditional Chinese society). 
14  China scholars increasingly refer to the recent political changes in China as moves 
toward or a return to “hard authoritarianism.”  In the absence of a clear definition of 
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This article investigates the legal, political, and 
socioeconomic factors that drove this transformation.  Building upon 
fieldwork in two Chinese counties, it also examines the 
transformation’s socioeconomic impact on China’s several hundred 
million farmers and ex-farmers and political impact on the Chinese 
regime.  
 
The article contends that China’s dairy (and dietary) tale 
reveals a lesser-known aspect of China’s tale of globalization.  While 
the West views China as the biggest beneficiary of globalization, 
taking advantage of the West’s vast markets to industrialize, 
globalization also exposed Chinese farmers to systemic income 
insecurity, job losses, social dislocation, and community 
disintegration—like farmers in much of the global South and workers 
in some manufacturing sectors in the global North.15  As backlashes 
against the current global economic regime are empowering 
authoritarian leaders around the world, similar forces may also be at 
work in China.  The economic insecurity and social dislocation 
experienced by hundreds of millions of rural Chinese may be 
creating a welcoming environment for a political strongman, a more 
interventionist industrial policy, and more generally, a turn against 
(neo)liberalism.16  Milk helps tell this story. 
 
The rest of this article proceeds to tell the double-sided story 
of China’s embrace of a West-dominated global economic order and 
the impact of that embrace on China itself—through the lens of milk.  
Part II narrates the cultivation of a taste for milk and the subsequent 
social history of milk in twentieth-century China.  The social origin 
                                                 
“hard authoritarianism,” there is a consensus that soft and hard authoritarianism fall 
on a spectrum, with soft implying less and hard implying more state penetration, 
coercion, and repression.  See Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, Assessing China’s Situation 
and Challenges, 5 CONTEMP. CHINA POL. ECON. & STRATEGIC REL. 537, 549 (2019); 
see generally CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIANISM 
REVIVAL IS UNDERMINING ITS RISE (2018). 
15   See, e.g., ISPI, CHINA: CHAMPION OF (WHICH) GLOBALISATION? (Alessia 
Amighini ed., 2018), https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/chin 
achampion_web_1_0.pdf [hereinafter CHINA: CHAMPION OF (WHICH) 
GLOBALISATION?] (providing the view of China as a globalization winner); Branko 
Milanovic, Winners of Globalization: The Rich and the Chinese Middle Class.     
Losers: The American Middle Class, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/winners-of-globalization-_b_4603454; see 
generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS REVISITED: 
ANTI-GLOBALIZATION IN THE ERA OF TRUMP (2018) (for information on job losses 
and displacement in the global South and some manufacturing sectors of the global 
North); see generally WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED: A 
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR AN INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION (Alvaro Santos et al. eds., 
2019) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE & INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED]. 
16  See infra Section V. 
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of milk in China was iconic of the Sino-West relations of the late 
Qing and Republican periods (1840-1949), in which the West was a 
cohort of materially superior powers ambitious to turn a declining, 
inward-looking civilization into a vast market for Western goods.17  
To escape imperialism and semi-colonialism, Chinese elites adopted 
the Western—particularly the United States (“U.S.”)—notion of 
cow’s milk as “nature’s perfect food,” hoping that it would 
strengthen the weak body of the Chinese people and, overtime, the 
weak body politic of the Chinese nation.18  In the absence of an 
abundance of cow’s milk, doujiang, the native soy drink, was 
rebranded as “soymilk” and promoted as the Chinese solution to the 
Chinese problem of “backwardness.”19  These ideas about milk are 
still prominent today.20 
 
While dairy production and consumption were insignificant 
during the Mao era (1949-1976), they achieved remarkable growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of China’s property reform known 
as the Household Responsibility System (“HRS”).21  HRS partially 
privatized rural landholdings, created one of the most egalitarian 
distributions of farmland in the world, and provided a source of 
livelihood for hundreds of millions of rural Chinese.22  The local 
histories of milk and soybeans in Mountain County (pseudonym) 
illustrate the benefits brought by HRS to rural Chinese citizens.23  
The local histories of milk and soybeans in River District 
(pseudonym), however, reveal that HRS also created dooming 
structural disadvantages for Chinese farmers, which would surface 
when their own government turned the country into a vast market for 
Western goods.24 
 
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”).  Part III describes the complex and conflicting impacts of 
the international economic regime on China’s dairy and soybean 
farmers after 2001.  On the one hand, the abolition of import licenses 
                                                 
17 See infra Section II.A. 
18  See generally Andrea S. Wiley, Milk for “Growth”: Global and Local Meanings 
of Milk Consumption in China, India, and the United States, 19 FOOD AND 
FOODWAYS 11, 11–33 (2011); Sabban, supra note 1, at 187–94 (explaining the role 
of milk in the effort to modernize—often understood as Westernize at the time—
Chinese society during the late Qing and Republican eras); infra Section II.A. 
19  See infra Section II.A. 
20  See infra Section II.A. 
21  See Justin Yifu Lin, The Household Responsibility System Reform in China: A 
Peasant’s Institutional Choice, 69 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 410 (1987). 
22  See infra Section II.B. 
23  See infra Section II.C.i. 
24  See infra Section II.C.ii. 
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and quotas and the drastic reduction in tariffs for dairy and soy 
imports allowed larger-scale, more mechanized, and often well 
subsidized foreign farmers to flood the Chinese market with their 
products.25  Small Chinese farms created by the early reform-era land 
regime could not compete.26  Hundreds of millions of farmers (and 
their sons and daughters) left home to seek work in cities and 
industrial towns as economic migrants.27  On the other hand, the 
same international economic regime has allowed China to expand its 
manufacturing and urban economy, absorbing much of the excess 
labor in agriculture and raising living standards for the vast majority 
of rural (and certainly, urban) Chinese families.28 
 
Part IV analyzes the Chinese state’s industrial policy 
responses to problems created by market liberalization.   Facing the 
pushing and pulling effects of the international economic order as 
well as China’s own demographic shifts and resource constraints, the 
Chinese state has been aggressively restructuring China’s 
agricultural economy since the mid-2000s through legal and 
financial means.  A core component of the restructuring is, once 
again, property reform―but this time to scale up and mechanize 
agricultural production, and in this process, destroy the highly 
egalitarian, “every rural family is a farm” model created by HRS.29  
The local iterations of the new reform in Mountain County and River 
District reveal a stark contrast: where there are more trade-inflicted 
agricultural job losses, there is more drastic, statist, and paternalistic 
industrial policy to restructure the outcompeted agricultural sector. 
 
Part V situates China’s recent political moves toward hard 
authoritarianism within the global context of increasing discontent 
                                                 
25   See Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-
products/dairy/trade/ (last updated Mar. 24, 2020); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
EIB-136, CHINA’S GROWING DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS (2014).  See also 
George Frisvold, The U.S. Dairy Industry in the 20th and 21st Century, 16 J. FOOD 
L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Dec. 2020) (examining government support programs for 
dairy farmers and the dairy industry’s transformation from small scale and little 
mechanization to ever-larger scale and ever-higher mechanization in the past one 
hundred years in the U.S.). 
26  Lin, supra note 21; see infra Part III. 
27  See Migrant Workers and Their Children, CHINA LAB. BULL. (May 15, 2019), 
https://clb.org.hk/content/migrant-workers-and-their-children; infra Part IV. 
28  See generally, Chris King-Chi Chan and Pun Ngai, The Making of a New Working 
Class? A Study of Collective Actions of Migrant Workers in South China, 198 THE 
CHINA Q. 287 (2009) (rural labor employed in manufacturing); Ngai Pun and Huilin 
Lu, Neoliberalism, Urbanism and the Plight of Construction Workers in China, 1 
WORLD REV. OF POL. ECON. 127 (2010) (rural labor employed in urban 
construction). 
29  See infra Section IV. 
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with globalization.  It goes beyond dairy and soybeans and looks at 
job losses in China’s agricultural sector as a whole.  A temporal 
comparison of agricultural jobs between 2001 and 2017 reveals the 
job loss number to be a staggering 155 million.  While this number 
can be celebrated as a success story of industrialization and 
urbanization, such celebration hides the enormous hardships of 
social dislocation, geographical and sectoral transition, and 
community disintegration suffered by these 155 million workers and 
their families.  In response, another component of the Chinese 
government’s rural restructuring is establishing social programs to 
mitigate socioeconomic decline of ex-farming communities. 30  
Fieldwork in Mountain County and River District reveals that these 
social protection programs and President Xi Jinping’s anti-
corruption and anti-poverty campaigns enjoyed strong support 
among rural residents.  Part V opines that the hardships suffered by 
rural Chinese citizens and the subsequent governmental responses 
may be creating a populist base receptive to paternalist governance 
and a political strongman in defiance of Western, particularly 
American, (neo)liberalism.       
II.  The Social Life of Milk in Twentieth-Century China 
A.  Cultivate a Chinese Taste for Milk 
In a now classic book, sociologist E. Melanie Dupuis 
narrates that the American taste for fresh cow’s milk began in the 
mid-nineteenth century with industrialization and urbanization, and 
fresh cow’s milk was used primarily as a breastmilk substitute for 
infants and a food supplement for weaned children.31  If we moved 
the time period forward by a couple decades, the same could be said 
about the beginning of a Chinese taste for fresh cow’s milk.  
Historically, cow’s milk was not part of the Chinese diet.  Despite 
the Qing rulers’ use of milk as an ingredient in royal cuisine or the 
use for making cookies in some coastal regions, the majority-Han 
Chinese population considered cow’s milk a “barbarian” food. 32  
When cow’s milk was introduced to China, it was promoted 
primarily as a nutritious food for infants and children.33 
 
                                                 
30  See infra Section V. 
31  E. MELANIE DUPUIS, NATURE’S PERFECT FOOD: HOW MILK BECAME AMERICA’S 
DRINK 50–51 (2002). 
32  Sabban, supra note 1, at 183–185; Yang Zhiyong (杨智勇), Wanqing Shiqi 
Zhongguo de Niunai Ye yu Niunai Shichang (晚清时期中国的牛奶业与牛奶市场) 
[China’s Dairy Industry and Dairy Markets During the Late Qing Period], 21 J. 
CENT. SOUTH UNIV. SOC. SCI. 223, 223 (2015). 
33  See infra text accompanying notes 51–54. 
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However, China’s post-1840 history also made its dairy tale 
distinct from that of the U.S.  In 1840, Britain invaded China under 
the pretext of defending British merchants’ property rights against 
the Qing government’s confiscation of opium and prohibition of 
opium trade.34  When China lost the war, it agreed in the Treaty of 
Nanjing to open up selected ports to allow foreign goods to be sold 
in China.35  Foreign merchants, missionaries, and other actors were 
allowed to reside in these port cities too, which created a demand for 
bovine milk on one hand and permitted the transmission of ideas and 
technologies about milk on the other. 36   Dairy operations were 
established in or near port cities using low-yield Chinese cattle.37  As 
foreigners’ demand for milk exceeded the indigenous supply, higher-
yield European cows were imported via these trading ports.38 
 
European and American missionaries were instrumental to 
the establishment of a Chinese dairy industry.  Missionaries brought 
European or North American cows to China and hired or taught 
Chinese workers to milk cows.39  The first Holstein cows imported 
from Europe were raised by a Catholic convent in Shanghai, which 
later facilitated the first inter-breeding between Holstein cows and 
indigenous cattle.40  
 
Although an interest in milk was initially limited to 
foreigners residing in port cities, this would soon change.  The first 
European milk company, Anglo-Swiss Milk Company, began to sell 
condensed milk to China via Hong Kong (which had become a 
British colony after the Opium War) in as early as 1874.41  Nestlé, 
the other major European milk player at the time, also sold its milk 
powder in port cities in China.42 
 
                                                 
34  See e.g., JULIA LOVELL, THE OPIUM WAR: DRUGS, DREAMS, AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN CHINA (2012). 
35  Id. at 223−40 (on the history of the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing). 
36  Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 223. 
37  Id. at 223–24. 
38  Id.; Shao Yishu (邵逸舒), Jiyu Ruye Shiyu de Minguo Shiqi Lanzhou Chengshi 
Xiandaihua Tezheng (基于乳业视域的民国时期兰州城市现代化特征 ) 
[Characteristics of the Modernization of Republican-Era Lanzhou City Through the 
Lens of the Dairy Industry], 30 J. ZHANGJIAKOU VOC. & TECH. C. 17, 17 (2017). 
39  Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 223–45; Geng Lei (耿磊), Ruye yu Chengshi 
Jindaihua: Yi Kangzhan Shiqi Xi’an Shi Wei Zhongxin de Kaochai (乳业与城市近
代化：以抗战时期西安市为中心的考察 ) [Dairy Industry and Early Urban 
Modernization: An Investigation Centered on War-Era Xi’an], 16 J. SHENYANG U. 
SOC. SCI. 636, 636 (2014). 
40  Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 224. 
41  Id. at 225. 
42  Id. 
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In 1906, the Qing government launched an all-out campaign 
to eliminate the sale, distribution, consumption, and cultivation of 
opium to fight the nationwide opium addiction. 43   Seizing the 
political opportunity, Nestlé (which by then had merged with Anglo-
Swiss Milk Company) advertised its milk products as a health-
restoring food to fight the addiction.44  Marrying Western science 
with traditional Chinese medicine and a Western merchandise with 
Chinese politics, one advertisement read: 
Milk produced by our company is made by chemists 
with innovative and improved methods. . . .  Milk is 
the most vital food for life, regardless of whether 
you are male or female, old or young.  Drinking our 
milk can smooth the blood and energy flow (qi), 
build the muscles, improve the spirit and essence, 
and strengthen the body. . . .  Today China has 
decided to ban opium; determined men and women 
should all abstain [from opium consumption].  But 
the weak body and exhausted spirit are worrisome.  
Purchasing and consuming our milk will be greatly 
beneficial . . .45 
 
In the Chinese political history, the Opium War marked the 
beginning of China’s “century of humiliation.”46  It ushered in an era 
of imperial invasions, payments of war indemnities, 
extraterritoriality, colonial enclaves, domestic peasant uprisings, 
government’s failed reforms of modernization, and more broadly, an 
existential crisis for China as a nation. 47   The national plight 
prompted Chinese intellectuals, social reformers, and government 
officials to debate how to reform China’s political, economic, and 
cultural systems to escape imperialism and semi-colonialism, and 
whether China should borrow Western technologies, institutions, and 
values to achieve these goals.48 
 
                                                 
43  Joyce Madancy, Unearthing Popular Attitudes Toward the Opium Trade and 
Opium Suppression in Late Qing and Early Republican Fujian, 27 MODERN CHINA 
436, 439−40 (2001). 
44  Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 225. 
45  Id. 
46   Matt Schiavenza, How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how 
-humiliation-drove-modern-chinese-history/280878/. 
47  See generally, LOVELL, supra note 34. 
48  See, e.g., FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE DISCOURSE OF RACE IN MODERN CHINA 127–29 
(1992) (providing a succinct description of these debates). 
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A key topic in these debates was the largely vegetarian 
Chinese diet, which some Chinese and Western intellectuals blamed 
as the cause of the “weak” physique of the Chinese people.49  Again, 
the similarities between the U.S. and China regarding the 
sociopolitical signification of milk were noticeable.  In the mid-
nineteenth century U.S. intellectuals and social reformers claimed 
that milk could perfect the individual American body and, by 
aggregation, the American society.50 In late Qing and Republican 
China intelligentsia, policymakers, agriculturalists, and urban dairy 
entrepreneurs glorified milk as the “perfect food” to build a strong 
Chinese population and, over time, a strong Chinese nation.51 
 
Also as in the U.S. decades earlier, children were put at the 
forefront of societal progress.52  One social reformer urged: 
In a situation in which China represents the “sick 
man” of Asia, if we want to revitalize the Chinese 
nation (fuxing zhonghua minzu) and revive national 
power (guoshi), it is even more imperative that we 
earnestly work [on the problem of child nutrition], 
because national rejuvenation (fuxing minzu) 
depends on a healthy citizenry, and without healthy 
children, how can there be a healthy nation?53 
 
As “milk became a symbol of Western wealth and power,”54 
Chinese reformers urged urban middle-class women to feed their 
children fresh cow’s milk or condensed milk and milk powder from 
America. 55   Just like their American sisters, the urban Chinese 
“middleclass wife became the ‘republican mother’ responsible for 
the creation of a moral civil society.”56  By 1928, cow’s milk had 
                                                 
49  Sabban, supra note 1, at 187–194. 
50  DUPUIS, supra note 31, at 8, 17; Wiley, supra note 18, at 16–18. 
51  Sabban, supra note 1, at 186–194. 
52  FU, supra note 5, at 98. 
53   Id.  Foreign companies such as Nestlé and Heinz continue to impact food 
consumption habits and cultural notions about food in China today.  See, e.g., Jun 
Jing, Introduction: Food, Children, and Social Change in Contemporary China, in 
FEEDING CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS: FOOD, CHILDREN, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 17–
20 (Jun Jing ed., 2000) [hereafter FEEDING CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS]; Eriberto P. 
Lozada, Jr., Globalized Childhood? Kentucky Fried Chicken in Beijing, in FEEDING 
CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS, supra note 53, at 114–34; Suzanne K. Gottschang, A 
Baby-Friendly Hospital and the Science of Infant Feeding, in FEEDING CHINA’S 
LITTLE EMPERORS, supra note 53, at 160–84. 
54  FU, supra note 5, at 89. 
55  Sabban, supra note 1, at 186–194. 
56  DUPUIS, supra note 31, at 57; FU, supra note 5, at 101. 
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become a popular food among the elites of the Chinese 
government.57 
 
Despite the fervor for milk among intellectuals, 
policymakers, and urban elites, “the birth of the Chinese interest in 
milk” was limited to the urban educated middle class.58  According 
to a 1936 Chinese article, it was estimated that China then had only 
ten thousand dairy cows and an annual milk production of under 
thirty million pounds.59  As one Chinese milk advocate admitted in 
1939, cow’s milk was still “an aristocratic beverage” beyond the 
reach of ordinary Chinese people.”60 
 
It was in this context that doujiang, a distinctly Chinese drink 
with similar color and nutritional richness, was given a new cultural 
and political life, elevated to the status of “milk,” and promoted as 
the pragmatic Chinese substitute for cow’s milk.61  To progressive 
intellectuals and reformers of Republican China, doujiang 
symbolized Chinese frugality, inventiveness, and hope of 
rejuvenation.62  Doujiang offered “a Chinese path of development.”63 
 
In 1949, the Communist Party of China (“CCP”) took power 
and founded the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). 64   The 
Communist government established dairy factories around big cities 
to provide milk for urban children and elderly residents. 65   The 
production of cow’s milk more than quadrupled during the Mao 
era.66 
 
After 1978, rapid economic growth led to a rapid rise in 
personal income. 67   Following its Republican predecessor, the 
                                                 
57  Shao Yishu, supra note 38, at 17. 
58  Sabban, supra note 1, at 186–194. 
59  Geng Lei, supra note 39, at 636. 
60  Sabban, supra note 1, at 186. 
61  FU, supra note 5, 102–08. 
62  Id. at 180. 
63  Id. at 90. 
64  Timeline of China’s Modern History, CHI. PUB. LIBRARY, https://www.chipublib. 
org/timeline-of-chinas-modern-history/ (last updated Apr. 30, 2012). 
65  Changbai Xiu & K.K. Klein, Melamine in Milk Products in China: Examining 
the Factors That Led to Deliberate Use of the Contaminant, 35 FOOD POL. 463, 465 
(2010). 
66   Shen Mei (沈美 ), Niunai Chanliang bi Jianguo Chiqi Zengzhang 154 Bei, 
Zhongguo Shixian “Da Fazhan” (牛奶产量比建国初期增长 154 倍，中国实现
“大发展”) [Cow’s Milk Production 154 Times the Level of the PRC’s Founding, 
China Realizes “Big Development”], XINHUA WANG (新华网) [XINHUA NET] (July 
20, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/food/2019-07/12/c_1124744433.htm. 
67  See GDP Per Capita (Current US$)–China, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worl 
dbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN (last visited July 16, 2020). 
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Communist government launched various nutrition campaigns 
promoting cow’s milk, deploying the same cultural and political 
tropes about milk, child development, and national rejuvenation.68  
One slogan epitomizes this blend of “scientific nutritionism” with 
nationalism: “A glass of cow’s milk strengthens a nation” (“一杯牛
奶强壮一个民族 ”).  This slogan is repeatedly mentioned in 
governmental documents, news media, and as the opening sentence 
of an annual report by the China Dairy Association. 69 
 
China’s emerging dairy companies eagerly embraced these 
cultural meanings of milk and, like their Republican-era 
predecessors, tapped into the mothering role of women in dairy 
advertisements.  China’s first dairy giant, Wahaha Group, for 
instance, had a catchy song in their advertisements in the 1990s and 
2000s: “Sweet and sour, nutritious and delicious. I drink it every day. 
How happy I am! Mama, I want to drink Wahaha Fruit Milk.”70  
                                                 
68  FU, supra note 5, at 188–89; Wiley, supra note 18, at 16–20; Eugenia Y. Lean, 
The Modern Elixir: Medicine as a Consumer Item in the Early Twentieth-Century 
Chinese Press, 15 UCLA HIST. J. 65, 77 (1995).  One of these milk promotion 
campaigns was the “School Milk Program” launched in 2000.  It was similar to the 
school health and “Got Milk” ad campaigns in the twentieth century U.S.  The 
program has evolved over the years.  For more detailed information, please visit the 
program’s official website, https://www.schoolmilk.cn/s/index. 
69  Guowuyuan (国务院) [State Council], Guanyu Tuijin Naiye Zhenxing Baozhang 
Rupin Zhiliang Anquan de Yijian (关于推进奶业振兴保障乳品质量安全的意见) 
[Opinion on Further Revitalizing the Dairy Industry and Guaranteeing the Quality 
and Safety of Dairy Productions], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG 
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (June 3, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/c 
ontent/2018-06/11/content_5297839.htm; Tan Zhongyang (谭中杨), Yibei Niunai 
Nengfou Qiangzhuang Yige Minzu–Xuesheng Yinyong Nai Jihua Jieshi Aoyunhui 
Jiangpai Bang Beihou de Mimi (一杯牛奶能否强壮一个民族？—“学生饮用奶计
划”揭示奥运会奖牌榜背后的秘密) [Can a Glass of Cow’s Milk Strengthen a 
Nation?—“Student Drinking Milk Plan” Reveals the Secret Behind the Olympic 
Medal List], ZHONGGUO JIAOYU XINWEN WANG (中国教育新闻网) [CHINA EDUC. 
NEWS] (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.jyb.cn/china/tyjk/201608/t20160828_670343.h 
tml; ZHONGGUO NAI YE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [CHINA DAIRY ASS’N], ZHONGGUO 
NAI YE ZHILIANG BAOGAO (中国奶业质量报告 ) [CHINESE DAIRY INDUSTRY 
QUALITY REPORT] (2017). 
70  See Lanting Ke (兰亭客) [Lantinger], 90 Niandai Wahaha Guo Nai de Guanggao 
(90 年代娃哈哈果奶的广告) [90's Wahaha Fruit Milk Advertisements], TENGXUN 
SHIPIN (騰訊視頻) [TENCENT VIDEO] (Mar. 19, 2017), https://v.qq.com/x/page/f038 
5ili6zz.html (showing a video of some of these advertisements).  For a detailed 
account of the relationship between Wahaha and the Chinese government and the 
role the company played in the Chinese government’s effort of nation building, see 
Zhao Yang, State, Children, and the Wahaha Group of Hangzhou, in FEEDING 
CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS, supra note 53, at 185–98.  Ironically, the French food 
company Danone bought a controlling interest in Wahaha in 1997.  Id. at 197.  As 
this article later illustrates, the fate of Wahaha embodies the bittersweet relationship 
between building a strong Chinese nation and embracing globalization.  
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China’s per capita dairy consumption more than tripled between 
1996 and 2006.71 
B.  Property Law and China’s Small, Egalitarian Farm 
Structure 
During the majority of the Mao era, land and agricultural 
production were collectivized.  Rural collectives (People’s 
Communes) and state-owned farms owned all rural land, farm 
animals, and agricultural equipment.72  Villagers worked for their 
rural collective earning daily work points, which were then used as a 
basis for distributing the collective harvests and revenues amongst 
themselves.73  Workers of state-owned farms worked for the farms 
and earned monetary wages.74  Property relations concerning dairy 
operations were very similar to those in the Soviet Ukraine; cows 
were the property of rural collectives or state-owned farms, and cow 
raising was the responsibility of rural farm workers (particularly 
women and children).75  Beginning in 1982, however, the CCP and 
the Chinese government created what would later be called the 
Household Responsibility System (“HRS”). 76   Under HRS, rural 
collectives and state-owned farms were required to sell agricultural 
equipment and farm animals and rent out land plots to individual 
households;77 rent was zero for collective land but a positive sum for 
state land.78  To avoid frequent redistribution of land, the CCP and 
the central government fixed rural citizens’ rights to use and farm 
land plots to fifteen years in 1984.79  However, resistance to long-
                                                 
71  Xiangdong Lu & Huilai Zong, The Problems and Countermeasures After China’s 
Dairy Enters the Adjustment Period, 7 AG. ECON. PROBLEMS 5 (2008). 
72  HUAIYIN LI, VILLAGE CHINA UNDER SOCIALISM AND REFORM: A MICRO HISTORY, 
1948-2008, 23−49, 82 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2009); Forrest Zhang, Reforming 
China’s State-Owned Farms: State Farms in Agrarian Transition, 2010 4TH ASIAN 
RURAL SOC. ASS’N INT’L CONF., 365, 367−70, http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_re 
search/1089. 
73  LI, supra note 72, at 35−47, 96−97, 100−01, 131−33, 147−48. 
74  Zhang, supra note 72, at 370; see also infra Section II.C.ii. 
75  Author’s archival and fieldwork research, on file with Author; Monica Eppinger, 
Herding History: Legal Change, Norm Formation, and Transformation of the 
Dairyspheres of Post-Soviet Ukraine, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Dec. 
2020). 
76   ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ( 中国共产党 ) & GUOWUYUAN ( 国务院 ) 
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], Quanguo Nongcun Gongzuo 
Huiyi Jiyao (全国农村工作会议纪要) [Summaries of the National Rural Work 
Conference] (1982). 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79   ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ( 中国共产党 ) & GUOWUYUAN ( 国务院 ) 
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], DANGQIAN NONGCUN JINGJI 
ZHENGCE DE RUOGAN WENTI (当前农村经济政策的若干问题) [SOME PROBLEMS 
IN CURRENT RURAL ECONOMIC POLICY] (1983). 
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term private property rights was strong in the initial years of reform, 
and the fifteen-year policy was not implemented until after 1993, 
when tenure security became a governance priority.80 
 
The implementation of HRS had profound consequences for 
China’s agriculture and rural residents.  First, it created one of the 
most egalitarian distributions of land in the world in the form of 
private rights to possess, use, and benefit from land. 81   This 
egalitarianism was further consolidated by frequent village-wide 
land redistributions to accommodate changes in household 
demographics or in the total land area as well as by the prohibition 
of for-profit transfers of landholdings.82  In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, laws were enacted to fix village-wide land redistributions to 
once every thirty years.83  While these laws increased the duration 
and security of rural land tenure, the latter differs from private 
landownership in two critical respects.  Rural households cannot sell 
or mortgage their land.84  When the current tenure expires, all rural 
residents—as members of the village—will be entitled to receive 
new tenure in the new round of land distribution.85 
 
Second, the egalitarian land distribution, the prohibition of 
land sales, and a high population/land area ratio created a stable 
agricultural economic structure comprised almost exclusively of 
small family farms, with an average size of as low as 0.6 acre of land 
per farmer according to a 2010 FAO estimate.86   Reflecting this 
                                                 
80   ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ( 中国共产党 ) & GUOWUYUAN ( 国务院 ) 
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], GUANYU DANGQIAN NONGYE HE 
NONGCUN JINGJI FAZHAN DE RUOGAN ZHENGCE CUOSHI (关于当前农业和农村经
济发展的若干政策措施) [CERTAIN POLICY MEASURES CONCERNING CURRENT 
AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT] (1993) [hereinafter 1993 
POLICY MEASURES]. 
81  PETER HO, INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION: LAND OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN CHINA 9–10 (2005). 
82  See id. 
83  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa (中华人民共和国
农村土地承包法) [Rural Land Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, 
effective Mar. 1, 2003) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Oct. 10, 2002, at 28, art. 20 [hereinafter 
Rural Land Contract Law].  Most recently, the CCP and central Chinese government 
jointly issued a policy document, extending the current rural land tenure by another 
30 years.  ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG (中国共产党) & GUOWUYUAN (国务院) 
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], GUANYU BAOCHI TUDI 
CHENGBAO GUANXI WENDING BING CHANGJIU BUBIAN DE YIJIAN (关于保持土地承
包关系稳定并长久不变的意见) [THE OPINION ON MAINTAINING THE STABILITY 
AND LONG-TERM FIXITY OF LAND CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS] (2019). 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Lin Wanlong (林万龙), Nongdi Jingying Guimo: Guoji Jingyan yu Zhongguo de 
Xianshi Xuanze (农地经营规模：国际经验与中国的现实选择) [Rural Land 
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economic structure, China’s dairy and soybean farms were small; 
many of the farmers grew other crops, raised other animals, or 
engaged in simultaneous non-agricultural work.87 
 
China’s partial privatization of landholdings was 
implemented alongside market liberalization reforms.  Beginning in 
November 1993, the Chinese government enacted a series of policy 
changes, with the goals of (1) opening up agricultural input and 
output markets and letting the market set the price of goods; (2) 
transforming state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) into market players 
with clear property rights and independent management and 
finances; and (3) allowing for-profit transfers of rural land in the 
form of subleases. 88   In the same year, China began serious 
negotiations to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”), the predecessor to the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”).89 
 
The rising demand for agricultural goods drove prices up 
between 1980 and 1996.90  The increased price, in a system of private 
operation of farms, further stimulated the production of cow’s milk 
and soybeans.  Between 1991 and 2000, China’s cow’s milk 
production nearly doubled, and its soybean production increased 
more than 60%.91  By some calculations, at the time China joined the 
                                                 
Production Scale: International Experiences and China’s Realistic Choice], 7 
NONGYE JINGJI WENTI (农业经济问题) [ISSUES IN AGRIC. ECON.] 33, 37 (2017). 
87   See, e.g., CHINA'S PEASANT AGRICULTURE AND RURAL SOCIETY: CHANGING 
PARADIGMS OF FARMING 25−44 (Jan Douwe van der Ploeg & Jingzong Ye eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter CHINA’S PEASANT AGRICULTURE AND RURAL SOCIETY] (providing a rich 
description and analysis of Chinese farmers’ multiple economic activities). 
88  1993 POLICY MEASURES, supra note 80. 
89   Monica Hsiao, China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy 
Explaining China’s Desire for Membership in the GATT, 12 PACIFIC BASIN L. J. 431, 
431 (1994). 
90  9-10 Quanguo Nongchanpin Shougou Jiage Fenlei Zhishu (9-10 全国农产品收
购 价 格 分 类 指 数 ) [9-10 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price 
Classification Index], 2001 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2001 年中国统计
年鉴) [2001 CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2001c 
/i0910c.htm (last visited July 16, 2020) (cataloging major agricultural product 
purchasing price indexes from 1978 to 2000). 
91  For dairy statistics, see ZHONGGUO NONGYE NIANJIAN BIANJI WEIYUANHUI (中国
农业年鉴编辑委员会) [COMPILATION COMM. OF THE CHINESE AGRIC. YEARBOOK 
SERIES], NONGYE BU ( 农业部 ) [MINISTRY OF AGRIC.], ZHONGGUO NONGYE 
NIANJIAN (中国农业年鉴) [CHINA AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK] (1991) (providing 
that in 1991, China produced 5,243,000 tons of milk); see also ZHONGGUO NONGYE 
NIANJIAN BIANJI WEIYUANHUI (中国农业年鉴编辑委员会) [COMPILATION COMM. 
OF THE CHINESE AGRIC. YEARBOOK SERIES], NONGYE BU (农业部) [MINISTRY OF 
AGRIC.], ZHONGGUO NONGYE NIANJIAN (中国农业年鉴 ) [CHINA AGRICULTURE 
YEARBOOK] (2001) (providing that in 2000, China produced 9,191,000 tons of milk).  
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WTO, China had somewhere between thirty-one million and fifty-
four million soybean farmers and 1.4 million dairy farmers.92  There 
was no or very little mechanization for either dairy or soybean 
production.93 
C.  Dairy and Soybeans in Rural Chinese Life 
Administratively, China is governed by the central, 
provincial, prefectural, county, and township governments.94  The 
village is not part of government, although its governance is heavily 
                                                 
For soybean statistics, see 12-17 Zhuyao Nongchanpin Chanliang (12-17 主要农产
品产量) [12-17 Output of Major Agricultural Products], 2001 NIAN ZHONGGUO 
TONGJI NIANJIAN (2001 年中国统计年鉴) [2001 CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2001c/l1217c.htm. 
92  These numbers are very rough estimates.  According to the China Statistics 
Yearbook 2002, in 2001 China’s total acreage of crop cultivation was 155,708,000 
hectares; the total acreage of soybean cultivation was 13,268,000 hectares, and the 
total number of people employed in agriculture was 365.13 million.  12-14 
Nongzuowu Zong Bozhong Mianji (12-14 农作物总播种面积) [12-14 Total Sown 
Area of Crops] 2002 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2002 年中国统计年鉴) 
[2002 CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/yearbook2001/index 
C.htm; 5-1 Jiuye Jiben Qingkuang (5-1 就业基本情况) [5-1 Basic Employment 
Situation],2002 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2002 年中国统计年鉴) [2002 
CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/yearbook2001/indexC.htm.  
Given China’s roughly egalitarian distribution of farmland in 2001, the thirty-one 
million estimate is calculated by dividing the total soybean acreage by the total crop 
acreage, multiplied by the total number of people employed in agriculture.  The fifty-
four million estimate is based on FAO data, which estimates the average land size 
per farmer in China to be 0.24 hectare.  Lin Wanlong, supra note 86, at 37.  Dividing 
the total soybean acreage in 2001 from China Statistics Yearbook 2002 by 0.24 
hectare will yield the number fifty-four million.  The total dairy farmer estimate is 
made by dividing the total number of dairy cows (5,662,000) at the end of 2001 by 
the average size of Chinese dairy farms (3-5 cows) in 2002. 2002 ZHONGGUO NAI 
YE NIANJIAN (2002 中国奶业年鉴) [2002 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] tbl. 
1-4 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2002) (end-of-the-year number of dairy cows 1949-
2001); 2003 ZHONGGUO NAI YE NIANJIAN (2003 中国奶业年鉴 ) [2003 CHINA 
DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] 32 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2003).  
93  A term of art for describing small, non-mechanized dairy farms in China in the 
2000s is “backyard dairy farms.”  The image is a rural family raising cows in their 
backyard.  See e.g. H. Ma et al., The Evolution of Productivity Performance on 
China’s Dairy Farms in the New Millennium, 95 J. DAIRY SCI. 7074 (2012).  For 
literature on low levels of mechanization for crop cultivation, see e.g., Xiaobing 
Wang et al., Wage Growth, Landholding, and Mechanization in Chinese Agriculture, 
86 WORLD DEV. 30, 32 (2016) (charts illustrating percentages of land plowed, 
planted, and harvested by machines from 1980 to 2011). 
94  Administrative Division, STATE COUNCIL, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/ch 
ina_abc/2014/08/27/content_281474983873401.htm (last updated Aug. 26, 2014); 
see also OECD, EDUCATION IN CHINA: A SNAPSHOT 9 (2016). 
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influenced by the government.95  Parts of rural China are State Farms 
(guoyou nongchang, 国有农场).96  They are governed by the State 
Farm system comprised of the central, provincial, district, farm, and 
unit administrations.97  Mountain County in southern inland China is 
governed by the regular administrative system.98  River District in 
Heilongjiang Province in northeastern China is governed by the State 
Farm system.99 
 
I conducted eleven months of ethnographic work and four 
months of historical research in Mountain County and River District 
between 2014 and 2016.  Both counties have had a predominantly 
rural economy and population and are undergoing some 
industrialization and urbanization.  This fieldwork included 
participant observation, casual conversations, semi-structured and 
structured interviews, and household surveys.  I talked to roughly 
two hundred interlocutors in Mountain County and three hundred 
interlocutors in River District.  Historical research consisted mostly 
of reading local chronicles, old newspapers, government documents, 
family genealogies, and published or unpublished memoirs.  Some 
of these files were kept in local, prefectural, or provincial museums 
and libraries.  Some are book copies or photocopies that my 
interlocutors kindly gave me.  Some have been made accessible 
online. 
 
i.  Mountain County: Peaceful Rural Nostalgia100 
 
Mountain County has 400,000 residents, is a land mass 
slightly smaller than Rhode Island, and has over twenty townships, 
each of which in turn governs a dozen or two villages.  It is a rice-
growing region.  The mountainous terrain, land scarcity, and long 
                                                 
95  Compare STATE COUNCIL, supra note 94 (showing that the village is not an 
officially recognized form of government), with Yi Wu, Land Rights, Political 
Differentiation, and China’s Changing Land Market: Bounded Collectivism and 
Contemporary Village Administration, 14 ASIA PAC. J. 1, 1–4 (2016). 
96  Zhang, supra note 72, at 365–67; Philip C.C. Huang & Yuan Gao, The Dynamics 
of Capitalization in Chinese Agriculture: Private Firms, the State, or Peasant 
Households?, 10 RURAL CHINA 36, 65 (2003). 
97  Author’s own archival and fieldwork research, on file with Author. 
98  I deliberately avoid identifying the province in which Mountain County is located 
because I have done fieldwork relating to villager-conducted illegal real estate 
development in Mountain County; not identifying the province will better protect 
the anonymity of my fieldwork interlocutors there.  See Xiaoqian Hu, “Put That 
Bucket Down!”: Monday, Politics, and Property Rights in Urbanizing China, 44 VT. 
L. REV. 243 (2019). 
99  See Zhang, supra note 72, at 368; 
100  The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and 
historical research in Mountain County. 
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distances to major urban centers precluded the development of a 
local dairy industry.  To the extent that dairy was featured at all in 
Mountain County in the twentieth century, it was either in the form 
of milk powder as a nutritional supplement for the children and 
elderly people of relatively resourceful families or as a valuable 
social gift for infants and convalescents.  Non-fresh cow’s milk was 
introduced to a few restaurants in the county seat in the 1990s as a 
breakfast drink, along with doujiang, and cost twice as much as 
doujiang.  Mountain County did not develop a fresh cow’s milk 
market until the mid-2000s, when refrigerated trucks became 
available, and an extensive network of paved roads was being built. 
 
Contrary to dairy’s virtual absence, soybeans were an 
indispensable part of Mountain County’s rural economy and dietary 
culture.  After the implementation of HRS in the early 1980s, each 
rural family would grow soybeans and raise at least one pig on the 
farm.  Most soybeans were grown on the dividers that separated 
individual families’ rice paddies or embanked hillside rice terraces.  
Growing soybeans on the long narrow dividers formed a symbiosis 
with rice cultivation.  As the divider was made of dirt, it needed 
reinforcement to avoid collapsing.  Soybean roots provided such 
reinforcement.  Meanwhile, water from the paddies provided 
irrigation for the beans.  Growing soybeans on dividers also allowed 
families to cultivate other crops on the precious, scarce land; these 
other crops included wheat, mulberry trees (for raising silkworms), 
and sorghum (for feeding pigs). 
 
Rural families kept most of their soybeans for self-
consumption, and soybeans were consumed chiefly in four ways.  
First, soybeans were consumed as a fresh vegetable in late spring.  
The lack of greenhouse vegetable farming and of a sophisticated 
agricultural market meant that rural families in Mountain County 
only had preserved vegetables to go with the rice during the long 
winter and much of the spring.  As spring was ending, soybeans 
would grow plump while still green and tender.  Families would stir 
fry them as a fresh vegetable dish to break the monotonous wintry 
diet.  Second, soybeans were consumed as a protein-rich food for the 
Spring Festival, which is a three-week-long holiday in Mountain 
County.  In Mountain County in the 1980s and 1990s, the last week 
of lunar December was the week to prepare for the Spring Festival.  
Rural families would slaughter a home-raised pig and make large 
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quantities of tofu from home-grown soybeans.101  Third, soybeans 
were processed as foods for daily consumption, particularly during 
the cold months of the year.  These included fermented beans, 
fermented tofu, or soybean powder.102  Soybean powder, like milk 
powder, was sweetened with sugar and consumed with hot water and 
was a treat for children and the elderly.  Fourth, rural families would 
exchange some of their soybeans for precious cash.  Such exchange 
created a local soybean processing industry in which family-run tofu 
shops sold tofu to urban as well as rural families, and family-run food 
stands served hot, fresh soymilk to urban breakfast eaters. 
 
ii.  River District: Tumultuous Market Opening103 
 
River District has roughly 150,000 residents, is a land mass 
twice the size of Rhode Island, and has over ten State Farms and over 
one hundred Units.  Land is abundant and located on flat plains or 
gentle, rolling hills.  Plots are large and rectangular and farmed with 
heavy machines.  The soybean is one of the two crops grown in the 
region (the other being wheat before 2008 and corn after 2008).  
Unlike in Mountain County, dairy has always been an important part 
of the local economy since the District’s creation in the Mao era. 
 
During the Mao era, residents enjoyed stable wages, free 
public housing, and other welfare benefits conferred by State Farms.  
Farm governments also cultivated among residents a collective 
identity and sense of pride as employees of technologically advanced 
socialist State Farms.   
 
While rural residents in Mountain County unequivocally 
welcomed HRS in the 1980s, residents of River District 
overwhelmingly opposed it.  Residents feared that HRS would 
destroy all the material entitlements, collective identity, and sense of 
pride that came with the status of a State Farm employee.104  As one 
                                                 
101  Tofu and pork (and fish) are essential dishes on the New Year’s Eve dinner or at 
meals with relatives and friends.  See generally Watson, supra note 13 (discussing 
the cultural and ritual importance of pork in rural Chinese life). 
102   Landoushi means rotten soybean food.  Interestingly, the local dialect for 
fermented tofu (douru) literally means soy milk.  Doumi means soybean mist or dust, 
due to its fineness.  It is also interesting that the process of making tofu from soymilk 
is very similar to that of making fresh cheese from milk, and the same can be said 
for fermented tofu and some fermented cheeses, as well as for doufuhua (literally 
means tofu flower—a silky, semi-curdled product before the curd turns into tofu) 
and yoghurt.   
103  The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and 
historical research in River District. 
104  As a matter of fact, HRS was met with huge resistance in Heilongjiang Province, 
which had a much higher land-to-population ratio and degree of mechanization than 
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expression captured from the time, “We did decades of hard work, 
only to be reverted to the pre-liberation era overnight” (“辛辛苦苦
几十年，一夜回到解放前”).105  To induce compliance with HRS, 
Farm and Unit administrations sold machines and animals, including 
cows, at highly discounted rates to machine operators, Unit officials, 
and other residents and encouraged them to rent large areas of land 
at low rates (families renting large areas of land were locally called 
“family farms,” 家庭农场).  Public housing was also sold to the 
resident household.  To allay some of workers’ fears, Farm and Unit 
administrations preserved the worker status of the former employees 
and continued to subsidize their social security payments. 
 
A thorough implementation of HRS did not take hold due to 
a combination of factors: increasing wealth inequality between a few 
successful “family farms” and the remaining small farming 
households; the frustration and fear of a large number of failing 
“family farms”; and the need for revenue for the administration to 
provide social services and bail out failing “family farms.”  Hence, 
in the 1990s, there was an institutional reversal in which the vast 
majority of the land was managed and farmed by teams consisting of 
Unit officials and machine drivers, while a minority of the land was 
managed and farmed by a large number of households, each renting 
a small amount of land (locally called “small households,” “小户”).  
Despite this partial reversal for grain production, dairy farms, which 
were small in scale, were never re-collectivized. 
 
Between 1993 and 2001, the opening up of the agricultural 
input and output markets caused devastating price fluctuations for 
farmers in River District.  Before 1993, grain prices were set by the 
state and were set low to subsidize China’s urban industrialization.106  
Market opening led to immediate increases in grain prices.  Between 
                                                 
the rest of the country.  See JAE HO CHUNG, CENTRAL CONTROL AND LOCAL 
DISCRETION IN CHINA: LEADERSHIP AND IMPLEMENTATION DURING POST-MAO 
DECOLLECTIVIZATION (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (providing an in-depth analysis of 
provincial implementations of HRS). 
105  The pre-liberation era means the years before 1949.  The CCP and contemporary 
Chinese government portray the pre-liberation era as a dark era of feudalism, semi-
colonialism, and corrupt state capitalism.  See Robert Weatherly & Coirle Magee, 
Using the Past to Legitimise the Present: The Portrayal of Good Governance in 
Chinese History Textbooks, 47 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 41, 42, 62–63 (2018). 
106  Luo Jinqiang (罗进强) & Ren Liming (任立民), Woguo Liangshi Caizheng 
Butie de Lishi Yanbian Jiqi Zhongyao Zuoyong (我国粮食财政补贴的历史演变及
其重要作用) [The Historical Evolution and Importance of China’s Grain Subsidies], 
in ZHONGGUO LIANGSHI GAIGE KAIFANG SANSHI NIAN (中国粮食改革开放三十年) 
[THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S GRAIN REFORM AND OPENING] 123 (China Grain Econ. 
Inst. & China Grain Indust. Ass’n eds., 2009). 
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1993 and 1996, the price of wheat more than doubled, and the price 
of soybeans increased by two-thirds.107  Higher prices stimulated 
grain production nationwide, and prices began to fall.  Between 1996 
and 2000, the price of wheat decreased by 38%, and the price of 
soybeans decreased by 26%.108  
 
While the fall of wheat prices was caused by increased 
production vis-à-vis a relatively stable demand, the situation with 
soybean prices was slightly different, though it led to the same 
outcome.  As personal income rose, meat consumption rose and 
created a huge demand for soymeal.  This should, in a closed 
economy, increase soybean prices.  However, China was negotiating 
its WTO entry; importing soybeans would not only meet the rapidly 
increasing demand for soymeal, but it would also show China’s 
willingness to participate in international trade.109  As a result, total 
soybean import went from 2.9 million tons in 1995 to 12.8 million 
tons in 2000.110  The in-pouring of foreign beans caused prices for 
domestic beans to stagnate in 1997 and to fall in 1998.111 
 
The market opening crushed River District’s economy, as 
half of the district’s farmland was used for growing wheat, and the 
other half was used for growing soybeans.  Between 1996 and 1999, 
the local price of soybeans decreased by 35%, and the local price of 
wheat decreased by 18%.  Interlocutors who were once agricultural 
team members recounted with anger and anguish the “dark old days” 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  “Year after year we were losing 
money and going deeper in debt.”112  Team members were afraid to 
farm the land.  Some left the teams altogether.  The total cultivated 
area decreased by 7% in 1999 and further decreased by 6% in 2000. 
 
                                                 
107  The numbers are calculated based on purchasing price indexes between 1993 
and 1996.  9-10 Quanguo Nongchanpin Shougou Jiage Fenlei Zhishu (9-10 全国农
产品收购价格分类指数) [9-10 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price 
Index], 2001 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2001 年中国统计年鉴) [2001 
CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2001c/i0910c.htm 
[hereinafter 2001 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price Index]. 
108  The numbers are calculated based on purchasing price indexes between 1996 
and 2000.  Id. 
109  Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 177–78 (explaining the connection 
between soybean imports and rising pork consumption in China). 
110  FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select 
the “Crops and livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China” 
in the countries field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select 
“Soybeans” in the items field; select “1995” and “2000” in the year field; click 
“Show Data”). 
111  2001 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price Index, supra note 107. 
112  Xiaoqian Hu, Fieldwork Journal 2015-045 (on file with author). 
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Agriculture was not the only sector harmed by market 
opening.  Since the late 1980s, River District had been facing an 
explosion of the labor force, as workers’ children, who were born in 
the 1960s and 1970s (before China’s compulsory family planning 
policy was implemented), reached adulthood.  To create employment 
for these young adults, the District and Farm administrations 
established factories processing agricultural and husbandry 
materials.  Market opening struck a heavy blow to these factories and 
their farmer-suppliers.  Many of them were closed down or sold off 
cheaply to private individuals in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
Facing falling wheat and soybean prices, dwindling 
revenues, and the closing down of state-owned factories, the River 
District administration (and the Provincial State Farm 
Administration) looked to dairy and pork—the prices of which were 
still rising due to rapidly increasing urban consumption—as ways to 
diversify the local economy.  The administration promoted “a 
courtyard economy” (“庭院经济”) and encouraged each family to 
raise “two cows and one pig” (“两牛一猪”).  To expand the local 
dairy industry, Farm administrations purchased cows from bigger 
farms near major cities in northern China and resold them to local 
dairy farmers on deferred payments.  To make sure that dairy farmers 
were able to sell their milk, Farm administrations also established 
state-owned dairy processing companies to purchase raw milk.  
Despite these efforts, the dairy strategy was struggling to succeed.  
Around 2001, the last and biggest dairy processing company in River 
District declared bankruptcy, and dairy farmers had to sell milk to 
individual milk merchants, who then transported the milk to dairy 
processing companies in big cities hundreds of miles away.  
 
While many factories were closed down or sold off during 
the market liberalization reform, the District and Provincial 
administrations restructured, incorporated, and expanded a handful 
of factories known as “dragon-head enterprises” (“龙头企业,” the 
same term as is used by the central Chinese state now) to serve as 
engines of job creation and economic growth.  These included, 
among others, the Heilongjiang Wonderson Dairy Product Co Ltd (
完达山). 
 
Despite these efforts, there was massive unemployment in 
River District.  Over 40,000 people—out of a total population of less 
than 150,000—lost jobs.  Some of them, particularly women, exited 
the work force and became homemakers.  Many residents engaged 
in non-agricultural activities.  Many people—especially young 
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people—left home and worked in Beijing, Tianjin, and Dalian as 
migrant workers.  With a decrease in land rents and a lack of funding 
from upper governments, the District administration cut spending in 
the late 1990s.  Many offices were combined or terminated, and 
many employees were laid off or retained on contractual terms.  
Many teachers, who had been contractual workers rather than state 
employees, were fired.  Unit elementary schools were eliminated, 
and the students were transferred to the elementary school in the 
Farm administration seat tens of kilometers away.113 
 
*** 
 
In the Chinese sociopolitical life, milk is a living symbol of 
the Sino-West encounter, and of all the conflicts, aspirations, 
ambivalences, and uncertainties that this encounter entails.  Prior to 
the twentieth century, the Chinese government was unwilling to open 
its market to the West but was forced to do so under gunboat 
diplomacy.  A hundred years later, the Chinese government not only 
voluntarily opened its market, but also sought to institutionalize the 
opening through joining the WTO.  Once again, milk―and soy―are 
at the center of China’s relationship with the West, and more broadly, 
China’s relationship with globalization.  If the history of milk in 
twentieth-century China was intellectual and political and affected 
primarily the urban elites, the history of milk in twenty-first-century 
China is economic and political and affects the entire Chinese 
society―from villagers to urbanites to the ruling elite. 
 
III.  Market Opening and Trade Shocks 
 
A.  China Opens Up Dairy and Soybean Trade 
 
In December 2001, China joined the WTO.114  As part of the 
accession agreement, China drastically weakened protections for 
domestic dairy and soybean producers.  Although a developing 
country, China agreed to not use the investment subsidy exemption 
                                                 
113  With hindsight, the elimination of Unit elementary schools was inevitable, as 
China’s family planning policy was rapidly reducing the student population.  Yet, 
the process was quickened by a lack of government funds.  See generally Lu 
Hongyong, Rural School Closures Are Leaving Young Children Out in the Cold, 
SIXTH TONE (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1001617/rural-
school-closures-are-leaving-young-students-out-in-the-cold# (describing the vast 
number of underfunded and slimly populated elementary schools in rural China from 
the late 1990s to the present). 
114  China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_ 
e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
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available to developing economies. 115   Compared with other 
developing countries, China also agreed to a smaller percentage of 
domestic support that is exempted from reduction commitment 
calculations.116  Given that China had zero subsidies for agriculture 
prior to joining the WTO, China is not allowed to provide additional 
direct financial support to its agricultural producers beyond the 
exempted percentage.117  
 
China also reduced entry barriers for foreign agricultural 
producers.  China abolished, among other things: (1) state trading of 
soybean and dairy imports, (2) soybean and dairy import licenses and 
quotas, and (3) soybean and dairy export subsidies.118  In 2002, the 
average tariff rate for imported soybeans was 2.4%, down from 
114% prior to China’s WTO accession.119  In 1998, China’s statutory 
tariff for dairy imports was 46%; the post-accession average was 
11%.120  
 
Limited ability to subsidize domestic producers, low tariff 
rates, and the abolition of import licenses and quotas gave foreign 
dairy and soybean farmers largely unrestricted access to the Chinese 
market and freedom to compete with Chinese farmers.  Had Chinese 
farmers been able to produce soybeans and dairy at internationally 
competitive prices, the impact of these concessions would have been 
                                                 
115  Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49, ¶ 235 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter 
Working Party Report]; see WORLD TRADE ORG., Agreement on Agriculture, art. 6, 
¶ 2, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm#articleVI (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture]. 
116  Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 115, at art. 6, ¶ 4(a), (b); see also Working 
Party Report, supra note 115.  This exempted percentage is called the de minimis 
level.  All WTO Members are granted a de minimis level.  Agreement on Agriculture, 
supra note 115, at art. 6, ¶ 4(a). 
117  Working Party Report, supra note 115, at ¶ 235.  
118  Working Party Report, supra note 115, ¶¶ 104–38; see also U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL TRADE: COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS 
ON U.S. EXPORTS, at 7-6 (2011). 
119  Tariff Download Facility, WTO, http://tariffdata.wto.org/TariffList.aspx (last 
visited July 29, 2020) (select “All years, bound tariffs included” in “Filter”; select 
“China”; select “12 – Oil seeds” in “Products”; select subsection “1201- Soya beans, 
whether or not broken”; click “Next”).  The 2.4% rate was further reduced to a 
combined tariff rate of 1.5% in 2012 and remains 1.5% to this day.  Id. 
120  Will Martin et al., China’s Accession to the WTO: Impacts on China, in EAST 
ASIA INTEGRATES: A TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR SHARED GROWTH 35, 42 (Kathie 
Krumm & Homi Kharas eds., 2004); see also Frank Fuller et al., China’s Accession 
to the World Trade Organization: What Is at Stake for Agricultural Markets?, 25 
REV. AGRIC. ECON. 399, 405 (2003). 
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minimal.  However, this was not the case for soybeans, and after 
2008, this was no longer the case for dairy.121 
B.  Market Shock for China’s Soybean Industry: The 2004 
Soybean Crisis 
As income levels rose in China, demand also rose for meat 
(primarily pork) and dairy.122  Today, China is the world’s largest 
producer of pork, soymilk, and soy oil; the world’s second largest 
producer of chicken; and, as mentioned earlier, the world’s third 
largest producer of cow’s milk.123  The soybean experienced the most 
dramatic transformation.  For thousands of years it had been one of 
the five staples in the traditional Chinese diet.124  Now, it has taken 
on three concurrent roles in Chinese life: primarily, as an industrial 
input for mass production of pork; secondarily, as the raw material 
for making vegetable oil; and, only thirdly, as a food directly 
consumed by humans. 125   Due to these multiple roles, China’s 
soybean use nearly quadrupled between 2001 and 2017.126 
 
Had Chinese soybean farmers been able to compete with 
foreign producers, the rapid rise in soybean use would have been a 
boon for Chinese farmers.  This, however, was not the case.  In 2001, 
for example, China’s average producer’s price for soybeans was 
approximately 1.5 times that of the U.S. and approximately 1.6 times 
that of Brazil.127 
                                                 
121  See infra text accompanying note 127; see infra text accompanying notes 147–
52. 
122  See, e.g., Yuna He et al., Consumption of Meat and Dairy Products in China: A 
Review, 75 PROC. OF THE NUTRITION SOC’Y 385 (2016) (providing an overview of 
China’s rising dairy and meat, especially pork, consumption). 
123  Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178; MINDI SCHNEIDER & SHEFALI 
SHARMA, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, CHINA’S PORK MIRACLE? 
AGRIBUSINESS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA’S PORK INDUSTRY 7–8 (2014); U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 10, at 13. 
124  WILLIAM SHURTLEFF ET AL., HISTORY OF SOYBEANS AND SOYFOODS IN CHINA 
AND TAIWAN, AND IN CHINESE COOKBOOKS, RESTAURANTS, AND CHINESE WORK 
WITH SOYFOODS OUTSIDE CHINA (1024 BCE TO 2014): EXTENSIVELY ANNOTATED 
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCEBOOK 43–44 (2014). 
125  See, e.g., Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13 (providing an in-depth analysis of 
the soybean’s multiple roles in contemporary China). 
126  Market Database: Supply and Demand Overview, AGRIC. MKT. INFO. SYS., 
https://app.amis-outlook.org/#/market-database/supply-and-demand-overview (last 
visited July 29, 2020) (select “China” in “Country/Region”; select “Soybean” in 
“Commodity”; click “Download Entire Balance”). 
127   FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2020) (select the “Producer Prices-Annual” link under the “Prices” 
heading; click “Brazil,” “China,” and “United States of America” in the countries 
field; select “Producer Price (USD/tonne)” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” 
in the items field; select “2001” in the years field; click “Show Data”). 
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For the Chinese soybean industry, the first shock of market 
opening arrived in 2004.128  In the years leading up to 2004, the rapid 
increase in demand for soy oil and the cheap beans from the U.S. had 
created a rapidly expanding Chinese oil-crushing industry with firms 
of all sizes.129  The international soybean chain at the time was such 
that Chinese soy oil producers would pledge to buy beans from the 
U.S. during the spring planting season; payments would be made in 
the summer; and the beans would be shipped to China upon harvest 
in the fall.130  When Chinese oil companies were pledging to buy U.S. 
beans in the spring of 2004, prices in the U.S. reached an all-time 
high. 131   When it was time to pay, however, prices had nearly 
halved.132  Many Chinese companies decided to default.133  U.S. and 
transnational traders sought arbitration at the London-based Grain 
and Free Trade Association, which decided that despite the dramatic 
price decrease, Chinese buyers should make the payments as agreed 
upon in the spring.134 
 
Soybean prices continued to fall and did not rebound until 
2007.135  The result was massive bankruptcies of Chinese soy oil 
crushers and refineries and the subsequent takeover by major 
international agro-companies such as ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis 
Dreyfus, and Wilmar.136  By 2009, 80% of China’s soybean crushing 
market and 60% of China’s soy oil refining market were controlled 
by foreign firms.137 
                                                 
128  Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178. 
129   SOLIDARIDAD, CHINA’S SOY CRUSHING INDUSTRY IMPACTS ON THE GLOBAL 
SUSTAINABILITY AGENDA 3–6, 10–16, https://www.solidaridadnetwork.org/sites/sol 
idaridadnetwork.org/files/publications/China%20Soy%20report.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2020).   
130  Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178. 
131 Yang Mei (杨眉), 2004 Nian Dadou Weiji Shijian de Shimo (2004 年大豆危机
事件始末) [The Soybean Crisis in 2004], ZHONGGUO JINGJI ZHOUKAN (中国经济周
刊) [CHINA ECON. WEEKLY] (Feb. 18, 2008), http://finance.aweb.com.cn/2008/2/18/ 
2252008021810483390.html.  
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178. 
135  According to FAOSTAT, the average producer’s price for soybeans in the U.S. 
was $270 per ton in 2003, $211 per ton in 2004, $208 per ton in 2005, $236 per ton 
in 2006, and $371 per ton in 2007.  FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select the “Producer Prices-Annual” link 
under the “Prices” heading; click “United States of America” in the countries field; 
select “Producer Price (USD/tonne)” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the 
items field; select “2003,” “2004,” “2005,” “2006,” and “2007” in the years field; 
click “Show Data”). 
136  Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 170, 178. 
137  Id. at 178; see also ZANG YUNPENG (臧云鹏), ZHONGGUO NONGYE ZHENXIANG: 
WAIZI DAJU RUQIN ZHONGGUO NONGYE (中国农业真相：外资大举入侵中国农业) 
[THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA’S AGRICULTURE: FOREIGN CAPITAL MASSIVELY INVADES 
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For Chinese soybean farmers, market shock was a slower 
and longer process of being competed out of production.138  With no 
entry barriers, the steep price differences prompted soy processing 
companies in China—many of which were foreign multinationals as 
a result of the 2004 soybean crisis—to import beans from the U.S. 
and Brazil.139  In 2002, China produced 1.19 times as many soybeans 
as it imported.140   In 2016, China imported approximately seven 
times more soybeans than it produced domestically.141  Today, two 
thirds of the world’s soybean exports go to China.142  Domestically, 
however, soybean production shrank by approximately 20.4% 
between 2002 and 2017.143  One study estimated that, between 2005 
and 2010, 30% of soybean farmers from northeastern China (where 
River District is located) had been pushed out of business and 
became migrant workers in the city.144 
 
Prior to the current U.S.-China trade war, soybeans were 
“the largest U.S. export of any type to China,” contributing to 
roughly 10% of all U.S. exports to China.145  While U.S. farmers 
                                                 
CHINA’S AGRICULTURE] (Peking Univ. Press 2013) (providing an in-depth analysis 
of China’s “2004 soybean crisis”). 
138   See infra text accompanying notes 139−44; see also supra Section II.C.ii. 
(describing the lives of soybean farmers in River District); see also infra Section 
IV.C. (describing the lives of soybean farmers in River District). 
139  SOLIDARIDAD, supra note 129, at 6–8. 
140  FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select 
the “Crops” link under the “Production” heading; select “China” in the countries 
field; select “Production” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items field; 
select “2002” in the year field; click “Show Data”); Id. (select the “Crops and 
livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China” in the countries 
field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items 
field; select “2002” in the year field; click “Show Data”). 
141  FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select 
the “Crops” link under the “Production” heading; select “China” in the countries 
field; select “Production” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items field; 
select “2016” in the year field; click “Show Data”); Id. (select the “Crops and 
livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China” in the countries 
field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items 
field; select “2016” in the year field; click “Show Data”). 
142  Soybeans Accounted for the Majority of U.S. and Brazil Agricultural Exports to 
China in 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart 
-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=93573 (last updated July 25, 2019). 
143  FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select 
the “Crops” link under the “Production” heading; select “China” in the countries 
field; select “Production” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items field; 
select “2002” and “2017” in the year field; click “Show Data”). 
144  Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 181 (citation omitted). 
145  FRED GALE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., EIB-136, CHINA’S GROWING DEMAND FOR 
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS 7 (Feb. 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publicat 
ions/43939/eib-136.pdf?v=42058; Justin Choe et al., U.S. Soybean Exports to China 
Crushed Amid Rising Trade Tensions, USITC EXECUTIVE BRIEFINGS ON TRADE, Aug. 
2019, at 1–2, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/chinasoy 
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worry that their “best customer” would turn to Latin America and 
they would lose 300,000 soybean jobs,146 the life stories of tens of 
millions of Chinese soybean farmers have remained hidden and 
forgotten for the past two decades.  This article makes some of their 
stories visible. 
C.  Market Shock for China’s Dairy Industry: The 2008 
Melamine Scandal 
At the time China joined the WTO, the average producer’s 
price for milk was lower in China than in the U.S. and other 
developed countries; hence, trade opening had a limited impact in the 
initial years of the country’s WTO accession.147  Between 2001 and 
2008, China’s cow inventory more than doubled, and its milk 
production tripled.148  Still, demand for dairy outpaced production, 
and dairy imports increased.149 
 
China’s dairy industry experienced dramatic market shock 
in 2008 on three fronts.  First, rising income levels—in the context 
of China’s family planning policy, which limits births—were 
concomitantly driving up the costs of agricultural labor.150  Average 
income in agriculture more than doubled between 2001 and 2008.151  
                                                 
ebot.pdf (data on yearly U.S. soybean exports to China between 2016 and 2018); 
Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5700.html#2017 (last visited July 23, 2020) (data on trade with China 
between 1985 and 2020); see also Hallie Gu & Naveen Thukral, Soy Source: 
Brazil’s Share of Soybean Exports to China Hits Record, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2008), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade-soybeans/soy-source-braz 
ils-share-of-soybean-exports-to-china-hits-record-idUSKBN1FE111. 
146   Nathaniel Meyersohn, China Takes Aim at America’s Soybean Farmers, 
CNNMONEY (Apr. 5, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/05/news/economy/soy 
beans-china-trade-us/index.html. 
147  Fred Gale & Michael Jewison, China as Dairy Importer: Rising Milk Prices and 
Production Costs, 19 INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 189, 193 (2016). 
148  2009 ZHONGGUO NAI YE NIANJIAN (2009 中国奶业年鉴) [2009 CHINA DAIRY 
INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] tbl. 1-10 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2009) (end-of-the-year dairy 
cow inventories between 1975 and 2008); China Statistical Yearbook 2009: 12-19 
Output of Livestock Products, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) 
(providing China produced 10,255,000 tons of cow milk in 2001 and 35,558,000 in 
2008). 
149  BRAD GEHRKE & LESLEY AHMED, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE WITH CHINA: DAIRY IMPORT GIANT (2019). 
150   Xiaobing Wang et al., Wage Growth, Landholding, and Mechanization in 
Chinese Agriculture, 86 WORLD DEV. 30, 30 (2016). 
151  China Statistical Yearbook 2002: 5-22 Average Wage of Staff and Workers by 
Sector, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/sta 
tisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2002e/ml/indexE.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) 
(providing that in 2001, the average wage of a worker in the “Farming, Forestry 
Animal Husbandry, and Fishery” sector was 5,741 Yuan); China Statistical 
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This, in conjunction with rising input costs, resulted in small dairy 
farmers losing competitiveness to farmers in major dairy exporting 
countries such as the U.S.152  
 
Second, in April 2008, China signed a free trade agreement 
(“FTA”) with New Zealand, the world’s leading dairy exporter.153  
The FTA required China to eliminate tariffs on many dairy imports 
in 2012 and all dairy (and other) imports from New Zealand in 
2019.154  This FTA ushered in an era of massive dairy imports from 
New Zealand.  Today, New Zealand is China’s second largest dairy 
exporter, accounting for 21.5% of China’s total dairy imports (the 
European Union as a block is China’s largest dairy exporter, 
constituting 48.4% of China’s total dairy imports).155 
 
Third, the biggest—and certainly the most widely 
reported—food safety disaster in contemporary China took place in 
late 2008, tanking China’s rapidly growing dairy industry.156  At the 
time the scandal broke out, China’s inadequate dairy quality 
inspection system used nitrogen as a proxy for protein and tested 
milk quality by checking the nitrogen level in the milk.157  Taking 
advantage of this rudimentary system, dairy merchants and farmers 
added water and melamine—a toxic, nitrogen-rich chemical 
compound—to raw milk to increase volume.158  Nationally, it was 
found out that melamine-contaminated milk powder from twenty-
two Chinese manufacturers poisoned over 290,000 people (primarily 
infants), caused tens of thousands of hospitalizations, and at least six 
                                                 
Yearbook 2009: 4-26 Average Wage of Staff and Workers by Sector and Region, 
NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/ind 
exeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (providing that in 2008, the average wage of a 
worker in the “Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery” sector was 
12,958 Yuan).  See also Xiaobing Wang et al., supra note 150, at 33 (Figure 2 
showing a similar trend of wage growth for on-farm labor in agricultural production 
in China).  
152 Gale & Jewison, supra note 147, at 193. 
153  Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of New Zealand, China-N.Z., annex 1, pt. A, Apr. 7, 
2008. 
154  Id. 
155  These numbers are calculated based on the dairy import data in 2018 Nian 1-12 
Yue Zhongguo Ruzhipin Jinchukou Tongji (2018 年 1－12 月中国乳制品进出口统
计) [China’s Dairy Import and Export Statistics Between January and December of 
2018], AOZHOU CAIJING JIANWEN (澳洲财经见闻) [AUSTRALIAN FIN. NEWS] (Mar. 
2, 2019), https://afndaily.com/36852. 
156  Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 464. 
157  Id.  
158  Id.  
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infant deaths.159  Sanlu, China’s then largest milk powder processor, 
declared bankruptcy.160  Two other dairy giants, Mengniu and Yili, 
saw their sales drop by 80% in a matter of days, and the two 
combined saw their 2008 revenue drop by half a billion dollars.161  
Scores of people, including the former CEO of Sanlu and six high-
ranking government officials, received criminal punishments 
ranging from jail terms to the death penalty.162 
 
Researchers and the Chinese government attribute this food 
disaster to the highly fragmented and grossly under-regulated nature 
of China’s milk supply chain.163  In 2008, 42.9% of China’s dairy 
cows were raised on farms with fewer than ten cows and 64% of 
China’s dairy cows were raised on farms with fewer than twenty 
cows.164  60% of the raw milk supply to Chinese dairy processing 
companies was collected from individual farms, and 25% of the 
supply was collected from scattered dairy plots and milk collecting 
stations. 165   Only 14% of the milking stations had a hygiene 
license.166  There were no national quality standards for raw milk or 
derivative products, and the government had delegated inspection 
responsibilities to major dairy companies.167  Hence, in a world with 
                                                 
159  Id.; Andrew Jacobs, China to Investigate French Company Over Claims of 
Tainted Formula, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/1 
3/world/asia/13milk.html?_r=1&ref=asia. 
160  Gao Xingxiang (高兴翔), Sanlu Wangguo Fenbenglixi, Yijia Pochan Baozhu 
Quan Hangye (三鹿王国分崩离析，一家破产保住全行业) [Sanlu Kingdom 
Disintegrates, Bankruptcy of One Preserves an Entire Industry], SHIDAI ZHOUBAO 
(时代周报) [THE TIME WEEKLY] (Jan. 1, 2009), http://news.sohu.com/20090101/n2 
61527058.shtml. 
161  Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 464. 
162  See Wu Heng (吴恒), Sanlu Sanjuqingan Du Naifen Shijian Zeren Ren Jin Hezai? 
(三鹿三聚氰胺毒奶粉事件责任人今何在？) [Where Are the Persons Responsible 
for the Sanlu Melamine Poison Milk Powder Incident?], PENGPAI (澎湃) [SURGING] 
(Aug. 3, 2014), http://m.thepaper.cn/renmin_prom.jsp?contid=1259370&from=ren 
min (providing a list of high-profile responsible parties for the melamine scandal). 
163   Guixia Qian et al., China’s Dairy Crisis: Impacts, Causes and Policy 
Implications for a Sustainable Dairy Industry, 18 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. & 
WORLD ECOLOGY 434, 438 (2011); Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 464; Guowuyuan 
(国务院) [State Council], Nai Ye Zhengdun He Zhenxing Guihua Gangyao (奶业整
顿 和 振 兴 规 划 纲 要 ) [Planning Guidelines for the Reorganization and 
Revitalization of the Dairy Industry], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG 
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008 
-11/19/content_1154518.htm. 
164  H. Ma et al., The Evolution of Productivity Performance on China’s Dairy 
Farms in the New Millennium, 95 J. DAIRY SCI. 7074, 7076 (2012); 2014 ZHONGGUO 
NAI YE NIANJIAN (2014 中国奶业年鉴) [2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] 
32 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2014). 
165  Qian et al., supra note 163, at 438. 
166  Id. at 438, 439. 
167  Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 467. 
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no regulations, high fragmentation, rapidly rising demand, unlimited 
profit seeking, and easy availability of melamine in local stores, 
adulterating milk with water and melamine became a “latent rule” in 
China’s burgeoning dairy industry.168  
 
True and revelatory as it is, the above analysis misses the 
influence of trade opening on China’s dairy market structure.  As 
China’s raw milk prices exceeded the prices in the U.S. and New 
Zealand in 2008, Chinese dairy companies—many of which had 
major foreign investors—supplemented and even substituted raw 
domestic milk with cheap imported milk powder to make liquid milk 
and yogurt.169  The Chinese state’s failure to enact labeling laws or 
dairy regulations gave these companies free rein to engage in such 
activities.170  Liquid milk aside, China almost doubled its imports of 
milk powder between 2001 and 2008. 171   The rapid increase of 
imports limited the room for the expansion of domestically produced 
milk powder, which in turn limited demand for raw milk.   
 
Foreign competition and investments also led to a steady 
restructuring of China’s dairy processing industry.172  Small firms 
were being pushed out, large firms were becoming even larger, and 
in 2007, the top four dairy companies produced and sold nearly half 
of all of the milk products in China.173  
 
High concentration of the dairy processing sector combined 
with high fragmentation of the dairy producing sector resulted in an 
extremely uneven distribution of bargaining power and, hence, of 
                                                 
168  Id.; Qian et al., supra note 163, at 436. 
169  Wang Yongkang (王永康), Woguo Yuanliao Nai de Dingjia Ying Naru Shichang 
Jingji he Fazhi Guanli de Guidao—Dui Dangqian Woguo Yuanliao Nai Shougou 
Wenti de Yixie Sikao (我国原料奶的定价应纳入市场经济和法制管理的轨道—
—对当前我国原料奶收购问题的一些思考) [The Pricing of Domestic Raw Milk 
Should Be Incorporated in the Track of the Market Economy and Legal Regulation], 
in DI QI JIE ZHONGGUO NAIYE DAHUI LUNWEN JI (第七届中国奶业大会论文集) [A 
COLLECTION OF PAPERS FROM THE SEVENTH CHINA DAIRY CONFERENCE] 31−2 
(2016).  Between 2002 and June 2008, eight Chinese dairy processing companies 
had received over 576 million US dollars of capital investment from multinational 
dairy producers and investment corporations.  Qian Guixia (钱贵霞) & Xie Jing (解
晶), Zhongguo Yuanliao Nai Gongqiu Maodun Ji Qi Yingxiang Jiexi (中国原料奶
供求矛盾及其影响解析) [Analysis on the Contradiction of Supply and Demand of 
Raw Milk in China and its Influence], 42 NEIMENGGU DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE 
SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) (内蒙古大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. INNER MONG. U. 
(PHIL. & SOC. SCI.)] 58, 62 (2010). 
170  Wang Yongkang, supra note 169, at 32. 
171   Qingbin Wang et al., China’s Dairy Markets: Trends, Disparities, and 
Implications for Trade, 2 CHINA AGRIC. ECON. REV. 356, 366 (2010). 
172  Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 465. 
173  Id. 
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profits between dairy farmers and processing companies.  While the 
ratios of investments in dairy production, processing, and retailing 
sectors were 7.5 to 1.5 to 1 (respectively), the ratios of profits were 
1 to 3.5 to 5.5 (respectively).174  The disproportionate market power 
allowed major dairy processing companies to suppress the price of 
raw milk as a way to prolong their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
imported milk powder.175  Two scholars observed that on the eve of 
the 2008 melamine milk scandal: 
Economies of scale combined with marketing power 
in both input and output markets have allowed the 
major dairy companies to pursue aggressive growth 
strategies.  Their size has given them a level of 
economic importance such that small dairy farmers, 
milk collection stations and even governments 
(particularly provincial and local) have developed a 
state of dependency on their continued profitability 
and growth.176 
 
The suppressed producers’ price, rising costs of inputs, and 
inherently high risks of dairy production pushed many small dairy 
farmers out of business.177  In 2002, 45% of China’s dairy cows were 
raised on farms with fewer than five cows.178  In 2008, only 32% of 
China’s cows were raised on farms with fewer than five cows.179  For 
those who struggled to remain in the dairy production business, 
melamine became the easiest available means of cost reduction.  
Melamine was their attempt to modify the existing scheme of profit 
sharing, even if that attempt would lead to the collapse of China’s 
dairy industry, themselves included. 
 
*** 
 
For post-WTO China, milk and soybeans embody both the 
benefits and the costs of globalization.  China has become a world 
leading milk producer, consumer, and importer.  Most of the world’s 
soybeans are now produced outside China, and most of the world’s 
soybean exports are for Chinese consumption.  As the historically 
“barbarian” milk becomes more Chinese and the historically 
“Chinese” soybean becomes more global (more American and Latin 
                                                 
174  Qian Guixia & Xie Jing, supra note 169, at 63. 
175  Id. at 62–64. 
176  Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 465. 
177  Id. at 466. 
178  2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 32 tbl. 2-1. 
179  Id. 
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American, to be precise), globalization is also pitting the people who 
produce or process milk and soybeans against each other.  On the one 
hand, soybean farmers in the U.S. and Brazil and dairy farmers and 
companies in the U.S., Europe, and New Zealand rejoice in the vast 
newfound Chinese market and pump up their production.  On the 
other hand, Chinese soybean and dairy farmers and companies 
agonize over newly arrived foreign competition, scramble to cut 
costs, or else are pushed out of business. 
IV.  Government Response: State-Led Industrial Policy 
A.  Central State Response: Agricultural Industrialization 
Through Property Reform  
The Chinese government’s agricultural reports and policies 
suggest that it attributes Chinese farmers’ lack of competitiveness to 
the small farm size created by HRS; that the small size prevents the 
realization of economies of scale and in particular, mechanization.180  
The average farm size in China is 0.52 hectare (or 1.3 acres).181  The 
average farm size in the U.S. is about 176 hectares (or 434 acres).182  
Dairy operations have also been small.  In 2008, less than one fifth 
of China’s dairy cows were raised on farms with more than 100 head 
of cattle.183  The diseconomy of small scale is further exacerbated by 
the rising cost of labor.  Since 2009, the cost of labor has risen 
exponentially more than the costs of other agricultural inputs in 
                                                 
180  See Quanguo Nongye Kechixu Fazhan Guihua (2015-2030 Nian) (全国农业可
持续发展规划(2015-2030 年)) [National Agricultural Sustainable Development 
Plan (2015-2030)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Agric. et al., May 20, 2015, 
effective May 20, 2015) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Oct. 10, 2015, at 28 [hereinafter 
National Agricultural Development Plan] (promoting larger-scale operations for all 
agricultural activities, including crop cultivation, animal husbandry, and fisheries; 
giving special treatment to operations 10-15 times the size of an average household 
farm under HRS).  
181  According to Vice Minister of Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs, the 
average size of family farms in China in 2019 was 7.8 mu, or 0.52 hectare, and 210 
million out of the 230 rural families in China were operating a farm smaller than 10 
mu (or 0.67 hectare) of land.  Yu Wenjing (于文静) and Dong Jun (董峻), Quanguo 
98% Yishang de Nongye Jingying Zhuti Rengshi Xiao Nonghu (全国 98%以上的农
业经营主体仍是小农户) [98% of China’s Agricultural Operators Are Still Small 
Rural Families], XINHUA WANG (新华网 ) [XINHUA NEWS] (Mar. 1, 2019), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-03/01/c_1210071071.htm.  Given China’s 
highly egalitarian landholding created by HRS, the average size of family farms is 
the best available approximate for the average farm size in China.  
182  NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., VOL. 1, GEOGRAPHIC 
AREA SERIES, PT. 51, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 92 tbl.65 (2012). 
183  2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 32. 
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China.184  Table 1 illustrates the competitiveness of U.S. soybeans 
over Chinese soybeans.185 
 
 2010 2015 
China US China US 
Total Production Costs ¥301 ¥201 ¥488 ¥227 
Cost of Labor ¥81 ¥10 ¥156 ¥11 
Costs of Other 
Variable Inputs 
¥112 ¥70 ¥146 ¥82 
Table 1. “Average Costs of Producing 100 kg of Soybeans” 
 
It is in this context that the Chinese government views 
scaling up and mechanization as necessary for Chinese farmers to 
regain competitiveness.186  Once again, the Chinese state is relying 
on property reform to accomplish these goals. 
 
i.  Property Reform 
 
This new round of property reform consists of three steps.  
The first step is legalizing and simplifying for-profit agricultural land 
transfers.  Although the CCP lengthened agricultural land tenure to 
thirty years per redistribution and allowed for-profit land transfers in 
as early as 1993, that decision was made in a policy document rather 
than in legislation.187  In 2002, a year after China’s WTO entry, the 
National People’s Congress (China’s national legislature) enacted 
the Rural Land Contract Law to legalize the 1993 policy.188  Under 
the law, rural households can assign or sublet their thirty-year 
agricultural land tenure to other growers, including enterprises, or 
                                                 
184  See Gale & Jewison, supra note 147, at 194 fig. 3. 
185  NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N OF CHINA, CHINA YEARBOOK ON COSTS AND 
PROFITS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 27, 626 (2016). 
186  National Agricultural Development Plan, supra note 180; see Xinhua She (新华
社 ) [Xinhua News Agency], Quanguo Nongzuowu Geng Zhong Shou Zonghe 
Jixiehua lü Chaoguo 67% (全国农作物耕种收综合机械化率超过 67%) [The 
Comprehensive Mechanization Rate of Crop Cultivation and Harvesting 
Nationwide Exceeds 67%], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN 
ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Jan. 19, 2019), http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2019 
-01/19/content_5359371.htm.   
187   See Thomas Vendryes, Land Rights in Rural China Since 1978, 4 CHINA 
PERSPECTIVES 87, 89 (2010). 
188  Id. at 89–90. 
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use it as capital to join a corporate grower and become a 
shareholder.189 
 
In China, intellectuals hotly debate rural land reform.  Some 
argue that private and freely alienable property rights can enhance 
efficiency and encourage investment. 190   Others fear that 
privatization and alienability (including the ability to serve as 
security) would lead to rural dispossession and unemployment and 
threaten social stability.191  The Chinese state seems to have taken a 
middle road approach.  On the one hand, the 2002 Rural Land 
Contract Law (and subsequent legislation) lets the market allocate 
agricultural land on a non-permanent basis.192  On the other hand, the 
refusal to recognize private land ownership, sales, and mortgages is 
designed to prevent systemic landlessness and social dislocation.193  
 
The second step of the reform continues to reflect the 
Chinese state’s middle-ground stance.  Despite various changes to 
increase the alienability of rural land tenure, Chinese law forbids 
household farmers to secure bank loans with their land rights, out of 
fear that banks will dispossess them of land.194  On the other hand, 
the CCP-ruled government now allows agricultural co-ops and other 
                                                 
189  See Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 83, arts. 10, 32, 36, 42. 
190  See generally WEN GUANZHONG (文贯中), WUMIN WUDI: CHENGSHIHUA, TUDI 
ZHIDU, YU HUJI ZHIDU DE NEIZAI LUOJI (吾民无地：城镇化、土地制度和户籍制
度的内在逻辑) [WE HAVE NO LAND: THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF URBANIZATION LAND 
SYSTEM AND HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM] (2014); see James Wen & Jinwu 
Xiong, The Hukou and Land Tenure Systems as Two Middle Income Traps – The 
Case of Modern China, 9 FRONTIERS OF ECON. IN CHINA 438, 441 (2014); see 
generally ZHOU QIREN (周其仁), CHENGXIANG ZHONGGUO: XIUDING BAN (城乡中
国：修订版) [RURAL-URBAN CHINA: REVISED EDITION] (2013); Yu Jianrong (于建
嵘) & Chen Zhiwu (陈志武), Ba Diquan Huangei Nongmin: see generally Yu 
Jianrong Duihua Chen Zhiwu (把地权还给农民：于建嵘对话陈志武) [Return 
Land Rights to Farmers: Yu Jianrong in Dialog with Chen Zhiwu], 2 DONGNAN 
XUESHU (东南学术) [SOUTHEAST ACAD. RES.] 12 (2008). 
191  See generally CHINA'S PEASANT AGRICULTURE AND RURAL SOCIETY, supra note 
87; HO, supra note 81, at 11; Tiejun Wen (温铁军), Woguo Weishenme Buneng 
Shixing Nongcun Tudi Siyouhua (我国为什么不能实行农村土地私有化) [Why 
Can’t China Implement Private Landownership], 7 CAIJING JIE (财经界) [MONEY 
CHINA] 43–46 (2015); see generally XUEFENG HE (贺雪峰), DI QUAN DE LUOJI: 
ZHONGGUO NONGCUN TUDI ZHIDU QUXIANG HECHU? (地权的逻辑：中国农村土
地制度去向何处) [THE LOGIC OF LAND RIGHTS: WHICH DIRECTION FOR CHINESE 
RURAL LAND POLICY?] (2013); see generally HUA SHENG (华生), CHENGSHIHUA 
ZHUANXING HE TUDI XIANJING ( 城市化转型和土地陷阱 ) [URBANIZATION 
TRANSITION AND LAND TRAP] (2013). 
192  See Vendryes, supra note 187, at 90. 
193  See Tiejun Wen, supra note 191. 
194  Wuquanfa (物权法) [Property Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 
16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 184 (2). 
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agricultural companies that sublet land from household farmers to 
secure bank loans with these commercial subleases.195 
 
This arrangement may appear to violate the time-honored 
property principle, nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam 
ipse habet (“[n]o one can transfer to another a greater right than he 
himself (actually) has”).196  The Chinese state explains this anomaly 
with a three-tier land right structure: ownership (suoyouquan, 所有
权), the right to contract land (chengbaoquan, 承包权), and the right 
to farm/manage land (jingyingquan, 经营权).197  Ownership belongs 
to the state or a rural collective as a fundamental principle of 
socialism. 198   The right to contract land is an inalienable 
socioeconomic entitlement for members of the collective (or workers 
of State Farms) and is designed to protect them from permanent land 
dispossession and community dislocation. 199   The right to 
farm/manage land is an alienable property right that any agricultural 
actor can acquire at a price.200  It is this management right that can 
be transferred, used as capital for joining a co-op, or used as security 
for obtaining a loan.201  It is this right that the Chinese state hopes 
will transform China’s agriculture from small-scale, non-
mechanized household farming to large-scale, mechanized corporate 
farming.202 
 
A third major reconfiguration of property rights is the 
enactment of the 2006 Law on Specialized Farmers’ Cooperatives, 
which allows and encourages household farmers to scale up 
agriculture by using land rights as capital to set up corporate co-
                                                 
195  See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda 
Wenti de Jueding (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) [Decision 
on Certain Major Issues Concerning the Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms] 
(adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on Nov. 12, 2013). 
196  Nemo Potest Plus Juris Ad Alienum Transferre Quam Ipse Habet, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  It is called nemo dat quod non habet in common law.  
Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
197  Xinhua She (新华社) [Xinhua News Agency], Guanyu Wanshan Nongcun Tudi 
Suoyouquan Chengbaoquan Jingyingquan Fenzhi Banfa de Yijian (关于完善农村
土地所有权承包权经营权分置办法的意见) [General Office of the CPC Central 
Committee About Perfecting the Management Right of Rural Land Ownership 
Contracting Right: Opinions on the Division Method], ZHONGHUA RENMIN 
GONGHEGUO ZHONG YANG RENMIN ZHENG FU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) 
[THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Oct. 30, 2016), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5133019.htm. 
198  Id. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  Id. 
202  Id. 
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ops.203   The hoped-for advantage of the co-op is that household 
farmers can reap the benefits of mechanization and economies of 
scale without being dispossessed.204  They can leave their land to the 
co-op, seek a second source of income, and receive annual profits 
from the co-op.205 
 
To complement the property reform, the Chinese 
government also gives financial support to agricultural producers to 
help them scale up and mechanize. 206   The Chinese government 
subsidizes many aspects of agricultural production, including 
machine purchases, improved seeds, irrigation, plot leveling and 
combination, price support for selected grains, and special awards for 
larger-scale farms.207   A few numbers are illustrative.  Since the 
Chinese government began to subsidize farm equipment purchases 
in 2004, by the end of 2017 it had increased this subsidy 266-fold, 
with a total accumulation of ¥187 billion ($26 billion) over the 
fourteen years.208  The Chinese government also vows to transform 
more than half of the country’s protected farmland into large, 
irrigated plots suitable for machine operation by 2020.209 
 
To encourage the scaling up of dairy farms, the Chinese 
government subsidizes the construction of larger dairy farms, 
cooperatives, and compounds.210  Between 2008 and 2016, billions 
                                                 
203  See Chen Yuqing, Issues on Standardization of Farmers’ Cooperatives in China, 
9 ASIAN AGRIC. RES. 34, 34 (2017). 
204  Id. 
205  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongmin Zhuanye Hezuoshe Fa (中华人民
共和国农民专业合作社法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Farmers’ 
Professional Cooperatives] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective July 1, 2007) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Dec. 20, 
2006, at 35, arts. 3–5, 14, 16. 
206  Soumaya Bermouna & Junrong Li, China's Agricultural Project Finance and 
Support Policies: The Framework of China's Major Agricultural Subsidies, 9 EUR. 
FOOD & FEED L. REV. 171, 173 (2014); see also National Agricultural Development 
Plan, supra note 180. 
207  Bermouna & Li, supra note 206, at 173. 
208   Wang Xuqin (王许沁 ) et al., Nongji Gouzhi Butie Zhengce: Xiaoguo yu 
Xiaolü―Jiyu Jili Xiaoying yu Jichu Xiaoying Shijiao (农机购置补贴政策：效果
与效率——基于激励效应与挤出效应视角) [The Policy of Farm Equipment 
Purchase Subsidy: Effects and Efficiency―From the Perspectives of the Incentive 
Effect and the Crowding Out Effect], ZHONGGUO NONGCUN GUANCHA (中国农村观
察) [CHINA RURAL SURV.], no. 2, 2018, at 1, 2. 
209  Yangshi Wang (央视网) [CCTV], Guotu Ziyuan Bu: Touzi 6000 Yi Yuan Jian 
Gao Biaozhun Jiben Nongtian (国土资源部：投资 6000 亿元建高标准基本农田) 
[Ministry of Land and Resource: Invest 600 Billion Yuan to Build High-Standard 
Basic Farmland], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZIRAN ZIYUAN BU (中华人民共
和国自然资源部) [MINISTRY OF NAT. RES. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 
(June 26, 2012), http://vod.mnr.gov.cn/spxw/201206/t20120626_1114028.htm. 
210  2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 47. 
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of Yuan of subsidies were disbursed to thousands of the country’s 
largest dairy farms.211 
 
ii.  Results 
 
In 2002, only 20.6% of China’s rice and 1.7% of China’s 
corn were harvested by machines.212  In 2018, over 80% of all major 
grains and over 67% of all agricultural crops were planted, plowed, 
and harvested by machines. 213   In 1996, only 2.6% of China’s 
agricultural land changed hands from the original household farm 
under HRS to another farm.214  In 2018, 39% of China’s agricultural 
land was transferred by the original household farm to another 
farming entity.215  In other words, two fifths of China’s family farms 
have exited agricultural production.  The small, non-mechanized, 
highly egalitarian, “every rural family is a farm” model created by 
HRS is falling apart. 
 
The changes in China’s dairy industry are all the more 
profound.  In 2008, 69% of China’s dairy cows were raised on farms 
with fewer than twenty cows.216  By the end of 2018, 62% of China’s 
dairy cows were raised on farms with more than one hundred 
cows.217 
 
                                                 
211  2013 ZHONGGUO NAI YE NIANJIAN (2013 中国奶业年鉴) [2013 CHINA DAIRY 
INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] 41 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2013); 2014 CHINA DAIRY 
INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 47; CHINA AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK 117 
(2016); CHINA AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK 138 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 CHINA 
AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK]. 
212   NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N OF CHINA, QUANGUO GAO BIAOZHUN 
NONGTIAN JIANSHE ZONGTI GUIHUA (全国高标准农田建设总体规划) [NATIONAL 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF HIGH STANDARD AGRICULTURAL 
LAND] 4 (2013). 
213  Xinhua She, supra note 186. 
214  Lanpishu: Quanguo Nongdi Liuzhuan Tisu Jingti “Feilianghua” Jiaju (蓝皮书：
全国农地流转提速警惕“非粮化”加剧) [Blue Paper: National Agricultural Land 
Transfers Accelerate, Caution for Exacerbating “Non-Grainification”], DIYI 
CAIJING (第一财经) [FIRST FIN.] (May 9, 2016), https://www.yicai.com/news/50108 
52.html. 
215  Wanzi Changwen Jiedu Nongcun Tudi Liuzhuan Ruhe Tuidong San Si Xian 
Chengshi Loushi Fazhan (万字长文解读农村土地流转如何推动三四线城市楼
市发展 ) [Ten-Thousand-Word-Long Article Explains How Agricultural Land 
Transfers Propel Real Estate Development in Third-and-Fourth-Tier Cities], 
TENGXUN (腾讯) [TENCENT] (Aug. 11, 2019), https://new.qq.com/omn/20190811/20 
190811A038WD00.html. 
216  2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 32. 
217 Zhonguo Naiye 70 Nian Faxhan Huihuang Chengjiu (中国奶业 70 年发展辉煌
成 就 ) [Major Accomplishments of China’s Dairy Industry in 70 Years of 
Development], ZHONGGUO NAIYE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [CHINA DAIRY ASS’N] 
(June 6, 2019), http://www.dac.com.cn/read/newztyj-19060620001110210561.jhtm. 
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Despite these changes, the trade and market dynamics that 
characterized the soybean and dairy industries in the 2000s 
continued.  Between 2000 and 2016, China’s soybean imports 
increased by nearly seven-fold.218  With drastically lowered tariff 
rates,219 China’s dairy imports increased in weight by thirteen-fold 
and in value by fifty-fold between 2000 and 2018.220  According to a 
2019 study of global dairy competitiveness, the evaluations for China 
are negative across the board.221 
 
Foreign competition on the one hand and foreign investment 
on the other continue to push for higher concentrations of ever-larger 
players in China’s dairy processing industry.  In 2016 in China, eight 
out of the nine most popular milk powder products were foreign 
brands,222 and five out of the ten largest dairy processing companies 
were foreign-owned.223  China’s top eight dairy companies process 
over 70% of the domestically produced raw milk. 224   The 
disproportionate power continues to allow dairy companies to set 
their own milk standards, decide the prices at which they purchase 
milk from farmers, and discriminate against small dairy farmers—
just as they did prior to 2008.225 
                                                 
218  FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select 
the “Crops and livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China” 
in the countries field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select 
“Soybeans” in the items field; select “2000” and “2016” in the year field; click 
“Show Data”). 
219  In 2015, for example, China’s average applied tariff rate for dairy was less than 
one eighth Japan’s rate and less than one fifth the average world rate.  Wang Guang 
(王广) & Feng Qi (冯启), Zhongguo Ruye de Xianshi Yali Yu Zhanlue Jiyu (中国乳
业的现实压力与战略机遇) [Practical Pressures and Strategic Opportunities of the 
Chinese Dairy Industry], 4 RUPIN YU RENLEI (乳品与人类) [DAIRY AND HUMANITY] 
4, 10 (2017). 
220   Liu Lin (刘琳 ), Zhongguo de Naiye (中国的奶业 ) [China’s Dairy], 18 
ZHONGGUO XUMUYE (中国畜牧业) [CHINESE ANIMAL HUSBANDRY] 17, 25 (2019). 
221  Jiang Bing et al. (姜冰等), Shijie Ruye Shengchan ji Maoyi Geju Fenxi—Jianlun 
Zhongguo Ruye Guoji Jingzhengli (世界乳业生产及贸易格局分析——兼论中国
乳业国际竞争力) [World Dairy Production and Trade Situation Analysis—Also a 
Discussion on the International Competitiveness of the Chinese Dairy Industry], 47 
ZHONGGUO RUPIN GONGYE (中国乳品工业) [CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY] 36, 39–41 
(2019). 
222  Wang Guang & Feng Qi, supra note 219, at 8. 
223  ZHONGGUO NAIYE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [CHINA DAIRY ASS’N], 2014-2015 
NIAN RU ZHIPIN HANGYE FAZHAN ZHUANGKUANG YANJIU (2014-2015 年乳制品行
业发展状况研究) [2014-2015 DAIRY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT STUDY] 10, 12, 16 
(2016) [hereinafter 2014-2015 DAIRY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT STUDY]. 
224  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CHINA’S DAIRY IMPORTS INCREASE TO MEET GROWING 
DEMAND, BUT U.S.-ORIGIN PRODUCTS FACE STRONG HEADWINDS 3 (2018), 
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Global competition, high concentration in the processing 
industry, rising costs of labor and animal feed, and, in recent years, 
heightened environmental regulations continue to push small dairy 
farmers out of business and pressure existing farms to relocate, 
expand, or consolidate.226  According to the USDA, half of  the dairy 
farms near Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai were closed down in 
2019.227 
 
B.  Agricultural Industrialization in Mountain County228 
 
Due to land scarcity, isolation from the outside world, and a 
lack of industry and commerce, Mountain County was historically 
poor and agrarian.  County chronicles record that in 1985, 92% of 
the local workforce was in agriculture, and more than 60% of rural 
households lived below the national poverty line.  Farming was 
small-scale, subsistent, and used very little modern technology.  
  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, poverty drove many young men 
and women to work as migrant workers in factories on the east coast.  
In the years that followed, the decline of agriculture and the rise of 
industry, both in Mountain County and in China at large, continued 
to push rural young people away from the farm.  Today, about 50% 
of the rural labor force works outside of the county.  For those who 
remain in the county, most engage in off-farm work.  Full-time 
farmers are now a small minority.  They tend to be older, often in 
their late fifties, sixties, or early seventies, and they take up the land 
left by their non-farming family members and relatives. 
 
Not surprisingly, Mountain County’s agricultural workforce 
is increasingly comprised of elderly people.  In the eleven villages 
where I did fieldwork, of a total population of over thirty thousand, 
there were almost no farmers under the age of forty.  Many families 
had handed the land to older relatives to farm.  Some families had 
deserted the land altogether, often because their land was high up on 
the hillside and harder to farm with machines.  My interlocutors—
ranging from farmers to migrant workers, and from village cadres to 
county officials—all realized that as traditional household farming is 
unable to sustain basic living, as rural youths aspire to live an urban 
                                                 
226  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 224, at 2; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GAIN REPORT 
NO. CH19042, HIGHER PROFITS SUPPORT INCREASED FLUID MILK PRODUCTION 1–3 
(2019) [hereinafter HIGHER PROFITS SUPPORT INCREASED FLUID MILK PRODUCTION] 
227  HIGHER PROFITS SUPPORT INCREASED FLUID MILK PRODUCTION, supra note 226, 
at 2. 
228  The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and 
historical research in Mountain County. 
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life, and as today’s farmers are about to become too old to farm, 
agriculture in Mountain County will soon face an existential crisis.  
Who will farm the land tomorrow?  
 
Facing this impending crisis, agricultural industrialization 
came to be viewed by the county government as a potential solution.  
Starting in the early-2000s, the county government promoted 
commercial vegetable farming in several highly mountainous 
townships: disseminating farming knowledge; supplying seeds, 
chemicals, and basic technology support; and soliciting urban market 
avenues.  Starting around 2010, the government also pushed for 
“scale farming” (“规模经营”) projects in or near flat areas.  Officials 
were appointed to seek agricultural companies and cooperatives to 
sublet land from local villagers and start a commercial farm.  The 
government hoped that by scaling up, commercializing, and 
corporatizing agricultural production, profits would rise to a level 
that would attract some entrepreneurs to invest in farming. 
 
Because of the mountainous terrain, entrepreneurial farms in 
Mountain County mostly specialized in fruits, teas, tree nuts, 
mushrooms, vegetables, and organic rice.  Mountain County now has 
a lively industry specializing in high-altitude mountain vegetables, 
tea, and fungi.  Soybean production has been phased out in the 
county.  So have wheat and corn.  On the other hand, dairy has 
entered most rural and urban households in the forms of baby 
formula, milk powder, ultra-pasteurized milk packages, refrigerated 
milk, or yogurt. 
 
C.  Agricultural Industrialization in River District229 
 
Before 2009, land in River District was leased to individual 
household farmers or farming teams for specific durations; the latter 
would pay rent to the Farm administration, farm the land, and keep 
the remaining profits.  Between 2009 and 2012, without consulting 
or compensating the local residents, the District administration 
terminated or refused to renew leases to individual farmers or 
farming teams.  In their place, the administration established 
specialized agricultural producers’ co-ops to farm the land.  Ex-
farmers were entitled to buy a small guaranteed number of “land 
shares” in the co-op at prices set by the Farm administration as well 
as any remaining shares at the market rate, and they were entitled to 
receive dividends based on their shares.  The co-op was managed by 
                                                 
229  The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and 
historical research in River District. 
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Unit officials and technicians appointed or recruited by the Farm 
administration.  Unit officials hired individual machine owners and 
temporary laborers to work the land. 
 
To accompany the vastly larger scale of production, the 
District administration ordered large agricultural machines from both 
domestic manufacturers and manufacturers in the U.S. and Europe.  
These machines were then sold to private individuals with 
government subsidies. 
 
In the past, most residents lived in single-story brick houses 
in their Unit near the land.  Between 2009 and 2013, almost all rural 
neighborhoods in the District were demolished, the land was 
reclaimed for farming, and all of the residents were required to buy 
and move into newly built apartments in the Farm’s urban center.  
Just as with compulsory cooperatization, the District administration 
did not consult the local residents.  On the one hand, compulsory 
urbanization pushed ex-farmers physically and psychologically away 
from the land, thus making it harder for them to resist 
cooperatization.  On the other hand, it created more convenient living 
spaces and urban job opportunities for ex-farmers, making it easier 
for them to adjust to non-farming life. 
 
Compulsory cooperatization and urbanization changed the 
lives of River District residents in fundamental ways.  It forced the 
overwhelming majority of farmers off of the land and into the city.  
It eliminated their rural, semi-subsistent way of life and subjected 
them to an urban, exclusively market-based way of living.  Residents 
who were able to find jobs welcomed or accepted the changes.  Those 
who could not find reliable jobs resented higher costs of living, 
heightened wealth inequality, and uncertainties of life revolving 
around the market.  For the few of those who strongly resisted the 
changes and who were brave enough to stage a petition or protest in 
Beijing during major national political events, the District 
administration required each State Farm to send officials to Beijing 
to catch them at train stations and long-distance bus stations and send 
them back.  These officials used a variety of methods—from 
calculated negotiation and compromise, to threats of violence, 
detention, and criminal punishment, to actual violence, detention, 
and court-sentenced punishment. 
 
Alongside these changes was a big push to expand the local 
dairy industry.  Although the 2008 melamine scandal devastated 
China’s dairy giants, it also catapulted two dairy processing 
companies in Heilongjiang—Wonderson and Feihe—from being 
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obscure local players to being national champions. 230   When 
government inspections did not find melamine in their products, 
panicked consumers switched from national brands to them. 231  
Seizing this opportunity, the Heilongjiang provincial government 
sought to turn the province into a leading dairy producer and 
processor.232  The rest of this section explains how this development 
strategy was implemented in River District. 
 
i.  Forced Concentration and Scaling Up 
 
In the past, dairy farmers in River District kept cows in a 
shed in their yard.  The cows grazed on state-owned land during the 
summer and were fed corn and soybean stalks collected from 
farmers’ own fields during colder seasons.  Milking was done either 
at a milking station miles away or manually by the farmers 
themselves, and the milk was sold to a middleman at the milking 
station or in a market center.   
 
Following the central government’s policy, the District 
administration constructed dairy compounds equipped with 
mechanized milking stations, running water, and staff members to 
organize feed provision and manage veterinary affairs.  Both carrots 
and sticks were used to push farmers to move their cows to the 
compounds.  Farmers could use the sheds for free.  Milking was done 
by machines right in the compound, and Wonderson’s milk truck 
would come every day to buy the milk.  If the purchasing price fell 
                                                 
230  Lousie Moon, Foreign Brands Still Dominate as Parents Do Not Trust China’s 
Home-grown Baby Milk Formula Makers 12 Years on From Melamine Milk Scandal, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/business/com 
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231  Wang Chunyu (王春雨), “Wan Da Shan” Ying You Er Peifang Naifen Wei Jian 
Chu Sanjuqingan (“完达山”婴幼儿配方奶粉未检出三聚氰胺) [Melamine Not 
Found in “Wandashan” Baby Formula], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY], 
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232  See Heilongjiang Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Jiakuai Xiandai Xumu Chanye 
Fazhan de Yijian (黑龙江省人民政府关于加快现代畜牧产业发展的意见 ) 
[Opinions of the People’s Government of Heilongjiang Province on Accelerating 
the Development of Modern Livestock Industry], HEILONGJIANG SHENG RENMIN 
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below a certain level, farmers would also receive a small subsidy 
from the administration.  In addition, farmers could get easy access 
to veterinary services and free immunizations for their cows.  On the 
other hand, the District administration prohibited free grazing 
(purportedly to protect wetlands and mitigate soil erosion) and made 
it virtually impossible for farmers who refused to move their cows to 
a compound to sell their milk.233  By April 2015, 90% of the cows in 
River District had been moved to these compounds. 
 
Dairy farmers had mixed feelings about joining the 
compounds.  Farmers, most of whom were in their late forties or 
fifties, welcomed the 50% reduction of labor in cow raising and the 
disappearance of filth and stench from their own yards.  They also 
welcomed the easy access to medicine and veterinary services.  
However, they had mixed views about disease outbreaks and drug 
use.  Some farmers complained that concentrated raising facilitated 
the spread of viruses and illnesses, and, as a result, more drugs had 
to be used on the cows.  This not only increased the costs of 
production but also gave Wonderson an excuse to reject their milk.  
On the other hand, some farmers pointed out that before compound 
raising, irresponsible farmers would secretly give excessive doses of 
drugs to the cows, causing companies to reject an entire truckload of 
milk and leaving other farmers unpaid.  Concentrated raising 
prevented such pernicious practices, as drugs were now administered 
by the compound staff.   
 
The biggest complaint, however, was the exponentially 
higher cost of feed.  The compound management constantly 
pressured farmers to adopt a total mixed ration (“TMR”) feed plan, 
alleging that it could maximize milk production.234  Yet, adopting a 
TMR plan would mean that farmers had to buy feed from other 
sources, such as alfalfa from the U.S. or cornmeal from Kuwait.  
Since such large purchases were made by State Farms, many farmers 
suspected that State Farms had “jacked up the prices” of imported 
feed and “taken all the profits” from dairy farming. 
 
ii.  Establish Corporate Dairy Farms 
 
A precondition for Wonderson to build a dairy processing 
plant in River District was a reliable, easily adjustable raw milk 
                                                 
233  See infra Section IV.C.iv. 
234  TMR is the acronym for “total mixed ration.”  It is the most common method in 
the U.S. for feeding cows that cannot freely graze on pasturelands.  David J. 
Schingoethe, A 100-Year Review: Total Mixed Ration Feeding of Dairy Cows, 100 
J. DAIRY SCI. 10143, 10143 (2017). 
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supply.  However, River District’s remote location makes it an 
unattractive place for private investors.  Realizing this difficulty, the 
District chief—an ambitious politician known for his “dictatorial” 
manner of governance (and later for convicted corruption)—forced 
Farm administrations to establish corporate dairy farms and required 
all Farm employees to invest in these companies as shareholders. 
 
The particular way in which these corporate farms were 
established determined their ownership and governance structures.  
The farms were managed by people who had been officials of the 
State Farm system and who, if circumstances required or permitted, 
could return to the administration as officials again.  In that regard, 
these farms were de-facto state-run enterprises.  However, the 
shareholders were not the state but State Farm employees.  Hence, in 
terms of property rights, these farms were privately owned 
companies. 
 
Visually, corporate dairy farms looked impressive.  They 
had large, new buildings, highly mechanized operations, and 
professional management.  However, both the shareholders and the 
management personnel I talked to expressed concerns about the 
farms’ economic viability.  Shareholders complained about a classic 
principal-agent problem.  The managers were experts in dairying, but 
they owned no shares in the company and had weak financial 
incentives to run the farms efficiently.  The shareholders had a direct 
financial stake in the company, but they knew nothing about dairying 
and, as a result, could not exert real supervision over the managers. 
 
Managers blamed the lack of profitability on the FTAs that 
China signed with dairy-exporting countries and on China’s WTO 
trade concessions.  Given that River District is far away from cities 
with vibrant economies, milk produced in River District was used 
predominantly to produce milk powder—a product facing the 
toughest competition from foreign producers due to its easy 
transportability and long shelf life.235  Technicians of corporate dairy 
farms complained that the administration invested too little in 
technology.  Farms lacked expertise in maintaining mechanized 
milking stations, young corn fermentation, and manure treatment.   
 
Many practices were inhumane to the cows.  Many sheds 
lacked dry beds for the cows to rest or sleep on.  The shed floors were 
bare concrete with no soft padding and were wet from the water hose 
                                                 
235  According to the Chinese government’s statistics, the average price of raw milk 
in 2015 in major exporting countries was 60% that in China.  2014-2015 DAIRY 
INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT STUDY, supra note 223, at 12. 
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(for getting rid of urine and mature).  During the long winter months, 
cows were not allowed to go outside.  Staff members told me that 
when they opened the gates in the morning, the stench was so 
overpowering that it made them sick. 
 
iii.  Subsidize Breed Improvement, Dairy Insurance, and 
Feed Crop Production  
 
In the wake of the Sino-New Zealand FTA, the District 
administration ventured to New Zealand and bought nearly twenty 
thousand high-productivity calves.236  The calves were then sold at a 
subsidized rate, mostly to members of newly established dairy 
corporations (on one State Farm, the subsidy rate was 67%).  New 
Zealand cows aside, the District administration also subsidized 
purchases of domestically-produced Holstein cows (on one State 
Farm, the subsidy rate was 50%).  These subsidies seemed to have 
ended by the time I began fieldwork in River District in May 2015 
and were replaced with guaranteed bank loans.  Dairy farmers were 
also guaranteed a certain acreage of land for growing young corn and 
alfalfa. 
 
The project of increasing the size and quality of cow stock 
in River District was far from smooth.  Initially, New Zealand cows 
were placed in the same sheds as local cows.  The mixing of the 
breeds led to an outbreak of brucellosis—a highly contagious 
bacterial infection—among New Zealand cows.  Hundreds of cows 
had to be slaughtered and buried deep underground.  Insurance 
covered part of the losses; the rest was borne by dairy farmers and 
shareholders of corporate farms.  I was also told anecdotally that not 
all cows infected with brucellosis were slaughtered and that in some 
cases, dairy farmers sold them to slaughterhouses to be finally sold 
as cheap beef to unknowing consumers.  After the epidemic ended, 
dairy farms separated New Zealand cows from local cows.  By the 
time I arrived in River District in 2015, all New Zealand cows were 
raised on corporate dairy farms in enclosed sheds and fenced-in, 
open-air grounds. 
 
 
 
                                                 
236  I was told by a District official anecdotally that Chinese buyers (both state and 
private) had exhausted the local calf supply and their partners could deliver only ten 
thousand calves after the signing of the contract. 
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iv.  Induce Wonderson to Build a Plant by Granting It 
Subsidy and Monopsony to Buy Local Milk 
 
The District administration negotiated a development 
agreement with the Wonderson Group.  Wonderson would build a 
baby formula manufacturing plant in River District that, according to 
the District administration, would “provide jobs for 10,000 dairy 
farmers, diversify the local economy, and be a major taxpayer to the 
District.”  The Provincial and District administrations would 
subsidize part of the construction.  To guarantee a steady supply of 
safe milk for the plant, the District administration also granted 
Wonderson a monopsony to purchase local milk. 
 
The plant was built in 2013, but it did not open until late 
2015 due to fierce competition and weak sales nationally.  In the 
interim, Wonderson purchased milk from River District to be 
processed by its plants in other parts of Heilongjiang. 
 
The magnitude of Wonderson’s market power was 
astonishing.  To reduce transportation costs, Wonderson decided to 
send milk trucks only to stations with a specific minimum production 
volume.  The District administration capitulated and closed down 
nearly half of its newly constructed compounds, forcing farmers to 
move to larger compounds. 
 
As a monopsony, Wonderson could reject or suppress the 
price of a particular truckload of milk based on “excessive levels of 
antibiotics or other drugs.” Talking with managers from large 
corporate dairy farms and a medium-sized, privately-owned-and-run 
dairy processing company, I learned that there would almost always 
be some level of antibiotics in a truckload of raw milk.  Given that 
the test was conducted by Wonderson, it had the power to decide 
whether to reject a truckload of milk or lower the price.  In the 
context of national competition and local monopsony, raw milk 
prices plummeted from ¥5-6/kg in 2013 to ¥3/kg in 2015. 
 
v.  Push Out Small Dairy Farmers 
 
Whether by design or by disaster, River District’s dairy 
strategy—in the global and national market contexts—pushed out 
River District’s small dairy farmers.  The displacement took ten years 
and multiple steps to complete. 
 
The first wave of exits took place when farmers were 
pressured to enter the newly constructed dairy compounds.  Rural 
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neighborhoods in River District were tens of kilometers apart from 
each other.  The District administration did not build compounds in 
neighborhoods with a small cow stock.  Farmers from these 
neighborhoods had to move their cows to neighborhoods that had a 
compound.  The move was impractical for many and inconvenient 
for most dairy farmers.  Many of them were not full-time dairy 
farmers.  Instead, the husband and wife team raised cows and grew 
soybeans and corn; the wife did most of the cow rearing, and the 
husband did most of the crop cultivation.  Moving to a cow 
compound in another neighborhood would mean husband-wife 
separation and an inability to help each other with housework or with 
dairy or crop production during busy times of the day or year.  Facing 
these difficulties, some farmers sold their cows and exited dairy 
production.  The same happened again when Wonderson refused to 
collect milk from small compounds, and the administration had to 
shut them down. 
 
A significant number of farmers exited dairy production 
between 2013 and 2015, before Wonderson opened its processing 
plant in River District.  The rising costs of feed, the declining prices 
of raw milk, Wonderson’s monopsony, and the uncertainty as to 
when Wonderson would open its plant in River District pressured 
dairy farmers to mitigate losses.  Some farmers reduced the number 
of lactating cows or the food supply for non-lactating cows (which, 
needlessly to say, was an inhumane practice).  Some sold part of their 
stock to other farmers or to slaughterhouses.  Some switched to calf 
breeding.  When farmers could no longer hold out, they sold all of 
their stock and exited dairy production. 
 
Contrary to local expectations, Wonderson’s opening of the 
dairy processing plant provided little relief to small dairy farmers in 
River District.  In a conversation with a key interlocutor in 2019, I 
learned that Wonderson could not compete with other infant formula 
brands on the national market, and due to poor sales,237 the plant in 
River District only accepted the “best” milk—milk produced by New 
Zealand cows owned by large-scale corporate farms. 
 
Recalling the “10,000 dairy jobs” promised by Wonderson 
and the River District administration, I asked my interlocutor what 
had happened to farmers who were raising cows in the compounds.  
He replied that most of them had sold their cows, left home, and were 
                                                 
237  For example, in 2016 Wyeth sold three times and Danone sold four times as 
much baby formula as Wonderson by revenue in China.  Wang Guang & Feng Qi, 
supra note 219, at 8.  
126                JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY             [Vol.16 
 
working in big cities as migrant workers, and that others had 
switched to raising beef cattle or hogs.  “No one raises [dairy cows] 
any more.  It’s all mechanized (没人养了，全是机械化),” he 
remarked.238 
 
*** 
 
From a strictly legal perspective, the fate of dairy and 
soybean farmers in post-WTO China is a combined result of 
international economic law and domestic property law.  China joined 
the WTO in pursuit of economic betterment.  However, the 
international economic regime also exposed Chinese farmers to 
unmitigated competition from larger-scale, well subsidized, and 
predominantly Western producers.  China’s HRS, which had created 
and benefited hundreds of millions of independent farmers decades 
earlier, also created dooming structural disadvantages for these very 
same farmers: the diseconomy of small scale and no access to land-
based financing.  Just as it redesigned the Maoist property system to 
increase farm productivity in the early reform era, the Chinese state 
is redesigning HRS to increase farm productivity in the age of global 
competition.  This time, however, the goal is to get big again, by 
eliminating (rather than creating) hundreds of millions of small 
farmers. 
 
As Chinese property law evolves, the backbone agricultural 
producer shifts from a public farming bureaucracy (the Mao era), to 
a private farming family (1980-), and now increasingly to a corporate 
farming enterprise.  It would be a mistake to think that the transition 
from the farming family to the farming enterprise naturally flows 
from a change in property law.  The Chinese government is adopting 
an active, paternalistic, and at times outright coercive industrial 
policy to facilitate this transition.  To the extent the fieldwork is 
illustrative, the local iterations of this policy in Mountain County and 
River District reveal a clear if blunt contrast: Where there are more 
trade-inflicted agricultural job losses, there is more drastic, statist, 
and paternalistic industrial policy. 
V.  The Social Costs of Globalization and the Hardening 
of Chinese Authoritarianism 
The current international economic system was created at a 
time of high optimism about market-centered economic 
development.  The beliefs of the day were that competition can make 
                                                 
238  Xiaoqian Hu, Fieldwork Journal 2019-005 (on file with author). 
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the economic pie bigger, 239  trade-inflicted job losses are 
“transitional,”240 and “the poor as a class will improve” from the 
cheaper goods and new jobs brought by free (or freer) trade. 241  
Meanwhile, critics have argued that this system traps workers and 
developing countries in “a race to the bottom”;242 brews discontents 
across the globe;243 benefits corporate elites at the expense of the 
working and middle classes;244 and, in Western liberal democracies, 
violates the government-citizen compact that increased trade 
opening should be accompanied with increased social protection of 
domestic constituencies from trade-inflicted disruptions.245  Since 
2016, scholars have revealed how flawed political representation and 
uneven distribution of costs and benefits under the current economic 
system have contributed to the global rise of authoritarianism, 
protectionism, and populism.246 
 
China is experiencing a rise in authoritarianism too, despite 
being an authoritarian regime at the outset of the change.  Since 
taking office in 2012, Xi Jinping has radically expanded his power 
as General Secretary of the CCP and has tightened the CCP’s grip on 
the country’s political, economic, and cultural institutions.247  More 
                                                 
239   Geoffrey J. Bannister & Kamau Thugge, International Trade and Poverty 
Alleviation (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 01/54, 2001); DEEPAK LAL, 
REVIVING THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 84, 86 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006). 
240  LAL, supra note 239, at 86. 
241  LOREN E. LOMASKY & FERNANDO R. TESÓN, JUSTICE AT A DISTANCE: EXTENDING 
FREEDOM GLOBALLY 158 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
242  JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENT 158 (W.W. Norton & Co. 
Inc. 2002); RAPHAEL KAPLINSKY, GLOBALIZATION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY: 
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 55–85 (Polity 2005). 
243  STIGLITZ, supra note 242, at 248.  
244  ALICE AMSDEN, ESCAPE FROM EMPIRE: THE DEVELOPING WORLD’S JOURNEY 
THROUGH HEAVEN AND HELL 50 (MIT Press 2007); STIGLITZ, supra note 242, at 84. 
245   John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982); 
John Gerard Ruggie, Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism, 
48 J. INT’L AFF. 4–11 (1994). 
246   See generally PAUL J.J. WELFENS, THE GLOBAL TRUMP: STRUCTURAL US 
POPULISM AND ECONOMIC CONFLICTS WITH EUROPE AND ASIA (Palgrave Macmillan 
2019); see generally WORLD TRADE & INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED, supra note 
15; DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE: IDEAS FOR A SANE WORLD ECONOMY 
1–8 (Princeton Univ. Press 2018); STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at xvii–xxxiii; LOKA 
ASHWOOD, FOR-PROFIT DEMOCRACY: WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS LOSING THE TRUST 
OF RURAL AMERICA 18−25, 33−36 (Yale Univ. Press 2018); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE 
LEFT BEHIND: DECLINE AND RAGE IN RURAL AMERICA 95–115, 140−158 (Princeton 
Univ. Press 2018); Duncan Kennedy, A Left of Liberal Interpretation of Trump’s 
“Big” Win, Part One: Neoliberalism, 1 NEV. L. J. FORUM 98, 103–07 (2017). 
247   See generally MINZNER, supra note 14 (tightening political, economic, and 
religious control); Carl Minzner, Intelligentsia in the Crosshairs: Xi Jinping’s 
Ideological Rectification of Higher Education in China, CHINA LEADERSHIP 
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specifically, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign, which 
allegedly had investigated 2.7 million officials and punished 1.5 
million by late 2018.248  Xi expanded state control and regulation 
over market activities and heightened government support of SOEs 
and other Chinese enterprises in an effort to promote “national 
champions” (globally competitive Chinese firms).249  In 2018, the 
National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to enshrine 
“Xi Jinping thought” (Xi Jinping sixiang, “习近平思想”), further 
solidify the Party’s leadership, abolish presidential and vice 
presidential term limits, and create the National Supervision 
Commission as the sixth branch of government.250  Analyses outside 
China have largely interpreted these events as political and legal 
moves by an authoritarian party-state to control increasingly 
uncontrollable factionalism and diverse social problems.251   
 
When globalization is discussed, China is portrayed as a big 
winner from the current international economic system and as using 
its economic prowess to assert stronger global influence.252  While 
globalization has indeed brought enormous benefits to the Chinese 
                                                 
MONITOR (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.prcleader.org/carl-minzner (tightening 
intellectual and educational control); see also Austin Ramzy, President Xi Jinping’s 
Rise in China, as Covered by The Times, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-career-highlights.html 
(providing a comprehensive summary). 
248  Gerry Shih, In China, Investigations and Purges Become the New Normal, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_p 
acific/in-china-investigations-and-purges-become-the-new-normal/2018/10/21/077 
fa736-d39c-11e8-a275-81c671a50422_story.html.  Western observers interpret 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as at least in part Xi’s pretext to purge his political 
enemies.  See, e.g., id; Charting China’s ‘Great Purge’ Under Xi, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
23, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162.  Pretext or not, 
the anti-corruption campaign did lead to the further concentration of power in Xi’s 
hands. 
249  RAN LI & KEE CHEOK CHEONG, CHINA’S STATE ENTERPRISES: CHANGING ROLE 
IN A RAPIDLY TRANSFORMING ECONOMY 1–5, 52–57 (Palgrave Macmillan 2019); 
ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI JINPING AND THE NEW 
CHINESE STATE 4–5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2018); Mark Wu, The ‘China, Inc.’ 
Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 261, 281–82 (2016).  
250  XIANFA arts.36–37, 41–50, 123–27 (2018). 
251  Compare MINZNER, supra note 14, at 8, 36, 86 (describing the CCP as a frozen 
regime undergoing internal decay), with Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China’s 
Turn Toward Law, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 281–82 (2019) (describing the CCP as 
actively using law to enhance its governance effectiveness), and Donald Clarke, 
China’s Legal Non-Construction Project, paper presented at China’s Legal 
Construction Program at 40 years: Towards an Autonomous Legal System?, 
Michigan Law School, (Oct. 11-13, 2019) (on file with author) (interpreting China’s 
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252  CHINA: CHAMPION OF (WHICH) GLOBALISATION?, supra note 15, at 13; Milanovic, 
supra note 15. 
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population as a whole, it has also caused agricultural job losses and 
systemic social dislocation in rural China.  The magnitude of the 
social costs of globalization connects China’s recent political 
changes with the recent political changes around the world, and 
compels us to scrutinize China’s changes in a global light.   
 
A.  The Social Costs of Globalization 
 
Milk and soybeans are microcosms of China’s agriculture.  
At the time that China joined the WTO, Long Yongtu—the official 
who led China’s accession negotiations—admitted that “agriculture 
would be the most vulnerable and therefore the most exposed to 
massive import competition”; and that “more than 9 million to 20 
million farmers would lose their jobs.”253  Hindsight suggests that 
Long’s estimate was overly optimistic.  In 2001, 364 million Chinese 
people worked in agriculture.254  In 2017, only 209 million worked 
in agriculture—a decrease of 155 million jobs. 255   The Chinese 
government interprets these numbers as success stories of 
industrialization and urbanization. 256   Yet, such interpretation 
glosses over the hardships of the dislocation and adjustment of those 
undergoing the “transition.”257 
 
Between 2001 and 2015, the share of agricultural exports in 
China’s total exports declined by nearly 50%, while the share of 
                                                 
253  Long Yongtu, China: The Implications and Key Lessons Learned Through WTO 
Accession, in EAST ASIAN VISIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 178, 
183–84 (Indermit Gill et al. eds., 2002). 
254  China Statistical Yearbook 2018: 4-2 Number of Employed Persons at Year-End 
by Three Strata of Industry, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).   
255  Id. 
256 See e.g., 2018 Nian Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Tongji Gongbao (2018 年
国民经济和社会发展统计公报 ) [2018 Annual Public Report on China’s 
Economic and Social Development Statistics], ZHONGGUO GUOJIA TONGJI JU (中国
国 家 统 计 局 ) [NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA] (Feb. 28, 2019), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zaxfb/201902/t20190228_1651265.html. 
257  Literature on hardships of migrant workers and their families and on community 
disintegration in rural China abounds.  See, e.g., ARIANNE M. GAETANO, OUT TO 
WORK: MIGRATION, GENDER, AND THE CHANGING LIVES OF RURAL WOMEN IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 3–6 (Univ. of Haw. Press 2015); Hongsong Liang et al., 
Liushou Women’s Happiness and Its Influencing Factors in Rural China, 117 SOC. 
INDICATORS RES. 907, 914–15 (2014); Yuying Tong et al., The Association Between 
Parental Migration and Childhood Illness in Rural China, 31 EUROPEAN J. 
POPULATION 561, 562 (2015); Ye Jingzhong, Left-Behind Children: The Social 
Practice of China’s Economic Boom, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 613, 613 (2011); Ye 
Jingzhong & Pan Lu, Differentiated Childhoods: Impacts of Rural Labor Migration 
on Left-Behind Children in China, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 355, 355 (2011); DOROTHY 
J. SOLINGER, CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN CHINA: PEASANT MIGRANTS, THE 
STATE, AND THE LOGIC OF THE MARKET 1–4 (Univ. of Ca. Press 1999). 
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agricultural imports increased by over 50%.258   During the same 
period, China’s agricultural trade balance changed from a small 
surplus of $1.7 billion to a large deficit of $52.6 billion.259  Today, 
despite the U.S.-China trade war, for every dollar China gains from 
agricultural exports, it loses 1.7 dollars from agricultural imports.260  
 
The soybean and dairy sectors epitomize trade-inflicted 
market competition, job losses, and social disruptions in rural China.  
Despite a surge (and, in the case of soybeans, a dramatic surge) in 
demand, domestic production of both products decreased.261  Small 
Chinese farmers lost the competition to larger foreign producers and 
were forced to exit from production.262  The Chinese state’s strategy 
of scaling up, mechanizing, and corporatizing the agricultural sector 
accelerates the process of dislocation and displacement.263  If China 
had between thirty-one million and fifty-four million soybean 
farmers, market forces and government policy have pushed the vast 
majority of them off of the land and into the cities.  If the estimate is 
correct that for every ten thousand tons of milk powder imported, 
thirty-four thousand Chinese dairy jobs are displaced, then in 2018, 
China’s imports of milk powder alone had a replacement effect of 
3.8 million dairy jobs.264  
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Mountain County and River District illustrate these 
profound socioeconomic changes.  Mountain County has switched 
from a predominantly agricultural economy to a labor exporter for 
Chinese cities.  River District has seen its agriculture completely 
scaled up and the overwhelming majority of the labor force pushed 
out of agriculture, and it, too, has become a labor exporter for 
Chinese cities.   
 
The rural-to-urban migration has been interpreted in China 
as a successful implementation of a Lewisian model of development 
(transferring excess rural labor to urban industries to achieve 
economic takeoff). 265   However, not all ex-farmers are able to 
transition from farming to an urban or industrial job.  Many ex-
farmers in River District cannot find jobs in the city due to older age, 
poor health, lack of education, or care responsibilities at home.  Their 
lives are precarious and heavily depend on access to poverty relief, 
free or subsidized healthcare, and educational support for their 
children.  Given China’s size, nationally, the population of farmers 
who cannot make this transition can be large. 
 
B.  The Hardening of Chinese Authoritarianism 
 
While doing fieldwork, I observed a counterintuitive 
phenomenon in both Mountain County and River District.  The 
central Chinese government enjoyed higher and more unequivocal 
approval among the less well-off residents than among the more 
resourceful and politically more connected residents.  The former 
group expressed stronger support for Xi’s anti-corruption and anti-
poverty campaigns, and for the government’s construction of rural 
infrastructure and establishment of rural social programs.  The latter 
group—despite being the bigger beneficiary of China’s economic 
growth—was much more skeptical, and cynical, of these government 
initiatives.  They were much more likely to view these initiatives as 
bureaucratic squandering of public resources, or as breeding grounds 
for corruption and favoritism (even if they were beneficiaries of 
corruption and favoritism in these and other contexts).  On average, 
the former group consisted of the vast majority of farmers and ex-
farmers, while the latter group was made up of the emerging urban 
middle class and the lucky few ex-farmers who managed to become 
non-farming entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
国商务部) [MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Mar. 6, 
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265  JUSTIN YIFU LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY 166–68 (2012); see, e.g., 
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(1954). 
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I interpret the former group’s higher respect for Xi Jinping’s 
government to three potential factors.  First, a more pro-rural 
governance policy. 266   Prior to the mid-2000s the Chinese 
government had been extracting wealth and resources from rural 
areas to fund urban industrialization; starting from the mid-2000s, 
the policy has been that “industry recompenses agriculture, cities 
support villages.” 267   The shift is reflected in the Chinese 
government’s abolition of agricultural taxes,268 construction of rural 
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and agricultural infrastructure,269 subsidization of agriculture,270 and 
establishment of a rudimentary rural social protection system.271  All 
of these rural economic and social programs are concrete measures 
to implement Xi’s anti-poverty campaign, which targets rural and 
impoverished areas in central and western China and vows to 
eradicate poverty in China by 2020.272 
 
Second, a potential, and certainly implicit, alliance between 
Xi Jinping and a rural base that is victimized or marginalized by the 
prevailing legal-economic order and that desires “a national hero” to 
fight the rich and the corrupt, provide for the poor, and “right the 
wrongs” of global capitalism.273  This alliance does not require a 
systematic discourse against globalization within the rural base.  The 
hardships the base has suffered may make it receptive to—and even 
positively demand—state protection, paternalism, and redistribution 
of wealth from the elites to the masses.  Nor does this alliance require 
everyone to believe that the leader is faithfully delivering protection, 
paternalism, and wealth redistribution.  As long as enough people in 
the base believe or are induced to believe that some degree of 
protection, paternalism, and wealth redistribution is being delivered, 
the alliance may be sustained.  In Mountain County and River 
District, a significant number of residents could point to the tangible 
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ited Apr. 12, 2020). 
270  See supra text accompanying notes 206−11. 
271  LING ZHU, FOOD SECURITY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR THE RURAL POOR IN 
CHINA 19–21 (Routledge 2017) (poverty relief, food assistance, reemployment 
initiatives, old age security for landless farmers, pension program for rural migrant 
workers); ARMIN MÜLLER, CHINA’S NEW PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE: CHALLENGES 
TO HEALTH REFORMS AND THE NEW RURAL CO-OPERATIVE MEDICAL SYSTEM 2–4 
(Routledge 2017) (rural healthcare). 
272  Juesheng Guantou, Kan Xi Jinping Zhe Yinian Fupin Gongjian Lu (决胜关头，
看习近平这一年扶贫攻坚路) [At the Juncture of Victory, Look at Xi Jinping’s 
Arduous Path of Fighting Poverty This Year], YANGSHI (央视) [CCTV] (Oct. 17, 
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benefits they had received from the government and conclude that Xi 
Jinping was “a good leader.” 
 
Third, a paternalistic agricultural policy to address job 
losses, social dislocation, and rural decline.  The state’s role in 
Mountain County’s agricultural economy is an example of a milder, 
more benign version of state paternalism.  The state’s role in River 
District’s agricultural economy is an example of a stronger and more 
dictatorial version of state paternalism, indistinguishable from state 
coercion.  Yet, even in River District, the magnitude of trade-
inflicted harm, the provision of a basic income through 
cooperatization, and the establishment by the State Farm system of 
an elemental safety net allowed the local government to coerce an 
entire population without causing a popular uprising. 
 
*** 
 
In the West, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and promotion of 
national champions have attracted much attention (and suspicion and 
criticism). Yet, his anti-poverty campaign and paternalist approach 
to rural and agricultural development remain largely unknown.  The 
fieldwork in Mountain County and River District is a deep probe on 
an extremely limited scale of the relationship between the Chinese 
state and rural Chinese citizens.  To the extent it can shed light on 
state-citizen relations in rural China, it may be the potential 
connection between the costs of globalization and a turn away from 
neoliberalism as embodied in the international economic order.  The 
job losses and social dislocation in some parts of rural China may be 
creating a welcoming environment for state protection and 
paternalism and for a political strongman in defiance of Western, 
particularly American, neoliberalism.274 
VI.  Conclusion 
DuPuis exclaims that “milk is an embodiment of the politics 
of American identity over the last 150 years.”275  The same can be 
said about the significance of milk in the collective Chinese 
imagination.  The American identity is shaped by America’s self-
image “as a leading voice against authoritarianism.”276  Similarly, the 
core of the modern Chinese identity is shaped by its understanding 
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of the West during the two Sino-West encounters, one in the late 
Qing and Republican periods, and one in the reform era. 
  
Milk is a product of the first Sino-West encounter.  The 
subsequent social history of milk in China is a live drama of all the 
conflicts, aspirations, ambivalences, and uncertainties that the Sino-
West encounters entail.  Unfortunately, in neither encounter did the 
West present itself in the best light.  The first encounter left the 
Chinese with a bitter collective memory of imperialism and 
colonialism.  The second encounter, which is still ongoing today, 
may be making an impression on a significant portion of the Chinese 
public—and I truly hope I am wrong—that Western liberalism is 
essentially anti-collective, anti-state, and anti-redistributive market 
fundamentalism.277 
  
China has embraced milk.  The world has embraced soy.  In 
the age of post-neoliberalism (if there will be one), milk and soy will 
continue to embody the complexity of national identities, the inter-
connectedness between nations and peoples, and all the benefits and 
costs, and promises and disappointments that may come with that 
inter-connectedness.  
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